Nội dung được dịch bởi AI, chỉ mang tính chất tham khảo
Sự Tự Tin Quá Mức và Chính Sách Thuế Doanh Nghiệp
Tóm tắt
Sử dụng mẫu các công ty trải qua sự ra đi của Giám đốc Điều hành (CEO) không do chính họ quyết định, chúng tôi điều tra xem liệu các công ty có Giám đốc Điều hành tự tin quá mức có tránh thuế nhiều hơn hay không. Chúng tôi tìm thấy bằng chứng rõ ràng về mối quan hệ tích cực giữa các chỉ số đo lường việc tránh thuế doanh nghiệp và sự tự tin quá mức của Giám đốc Điều hành. Do các bài kiểm tra thực nghiệm của chúng tôi sử dụng một bảng dữ liệu longitudinal về các năm công ty với sự ra đi không do chính mình quyết định của Giám đốc Điều hành và bao gồm các biến kiểm soát cho các hiệu ứng tĩnh của công ty cũng như các đặc điểm có thể quan sát được của công ty, chúng tôi có thể phân tách rõ hơn vai trò của một đặc điểm cá nhân đặc thù (tức là, sự tự tin quá mức) đối với kết quả thuế doanh nghiệp, từ đó làm phong phú thêm các tài liệu về sự tự tin quá mức, tác động của quản lý và việc tránh thuế.
Từ khóa
#sự tự tin quá mức #chính sách thuế doanh nghiệp #tránh thuế #giám đốc điều hành #ảnh hưởng quản lýTài liệu tham khảo
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