Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games

Games and Economic Behavior - Tập 56 - Trang 7-36 - 2006
Hongbin Cai1, Joseph Tao-Yi Wang1
1Department of Economics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA

Tài liệu tham khảo

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Games and Economic Behavior

Tập 56

7-36

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