Opting for the English rule: On the contractual re-allocation of legal fees

International Review of Law and Economics - Tập 63 - Trang 105928 - 2020
Mehdi Ayouni1, Tim Friehe2,3, Yannick Gabuthy1
1BETA (CNRS, University of Strasbourg, University of Lorraine), 13, Place Carnot, C.O. 70026, 54035 Nancy, France
2Public Economics Group (University of Marburg), Am Plan 2, 35037 Marburg, Germany
3CESifo Munich, Germany

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