On the properties of the nucleolus of a veto game

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 7 Số 2 - Trang 221-234 - 2019
Eric Bahel1
1Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, USA

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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