Về Nhận Thức Thực Nghiệm Trong Tài Chính Công Theo Không Gian

International Tax and Public Finance - Tập 12 - Trang 475-492 - 2005
Federico Revelli1
1Department of Economics, University of Torino, Torino, Italy

Tóm tắt

Bài báo này tập trung vào việc xác định thực nghiệm các mô hình lý thuyết về tương tác chiến lược dẫn đến một mẫu không gian trong chi tiêu và doanh thu của chính quyền địa phương. Nó chỉ ra rằng việc ước lượng một hàm phản ứng giữa các khu vực tài phán theo dạng rút gọn có thể không đủ để phân biệt giữa các lý thuyết tương tác chiến lược cạnh tranh. Một đánh giá về tài liệu thực nghiệm gần đây cho thấy rằng việc khám phá sâu hơn những hệ quả thực nghiệm cụ thể của các mô hình lý thuyết thay thế, cũng như khai thác triệt để các đặc điểm thể chế của cấu trúc chính phủ đa tầng và hệ thống bầu cử địa phương, có thể giúp xác định mô hình cấu trúc sinh ra sự tự tương quan theo không gian quan sát thấy trong các biến chính sách.

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

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