Oligopoly equilibria in electricity contract markets
Tóm tắt
Từ khóa
Tài liệu tham khảo
Allaz B., Vila J.L. (1993). Cournot competition, forward markets and efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory 53(1): 1–16
Borenstein S. (2002). The trouble with electricity markets: Understanding California’s restructuring disaster. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(1): 191–211
Borenstein S. (2005). Time-varying retail electricity prices: Theory and practice. In: Griffin J., Puller S. (eds) Electricity deregulation: Choices and challenges. Chicago, University of Chicago Press
Borenstein S., Bushnell J.B. (1999). An empirical analysis of the potential for market power in California’s electricity market. Journal of Industrial Economics 47(3): 285–323
Borenstein S., Bushnell J.B., Wolak F.A. (2002). Measuring market inefficiencies in California’s deregulated wholesale electricity market. American Economic Review 92(5): 1376–1405
Bushnell J.B. (2004). California’s electricity crisis: A market apart?. Energy Policy 32(9): 1045–1052
Bushnell J.B. (2005). Looking for trouble: Competition Policy in the U.S. electricity industry. In: Griffin J., Puller S. (eds) Electricity deregulation: Choices and challenges. Chicago, University of Chicago Press
Bushnell, J. B., Mansur, E., & Saravia, C. (2007). Vertical relationships, market structure, and competition: An analysis of U.S. restructured electricity markets. American Economic Review. Forthcoming.
Bushnell, J. B., & Saravia, C. (2002). An empirical analysis of the competitiveness of the New England electricity market. CSEM Working Paper WP-101, University of California Energy Institute. May. Available at www.ucei.berkeley.edu.
Farrell J., Shapiro C. (1990). Horizontal mergers: An equilibrium analysis. American Economic Review 80(1): 107–126
Fabra N., Toro J. (2005). Price wars and collusion in the Spanish electricity market. International Journal of Industrial Organization 23(3–4): 155–181
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (2003). Order amending market-based rate tariffs and authorizations. Docket nos. El01-118-000 and EL01-118-001, July. Washington, DC.
Ferreira J.L. (2003). Strategic interaction between spot and futures markets. Journal of Economic Theory 108, 141–151
Gans, J. (2007). Vertical contracting when competition for orders precedes procurement. Journal of Industrial Economics. Forthcoming.
Green R.J. (1999). The electricity contract market in England and Wales. Journal of Industrial Economics XLVII(1): 107–124
Green, R. J., & Le Coq, C. (2006). The length of contracts and collusion. CSEM Working Paper WP-154, University of California Energy Institute. June. Available at www.ucei.berkeley.edu
Hortacsu, A., & Puller, S. (2004). Testing strategic models of firm behavior in restructured electricity markets: A case study of ERCOT. Texas A&M University Working Paper.
Hughes J.S., Kao J.L. (1997). Strategic forward contracting and observability. International Journal of Industrial Organization 16(1): 121–133
Liski M., Montero J.P. (2006) Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly. Journal of Economic Theory 131(1): 212–230
Loxley C., Salant D. (2004). Default service auctions. Journal of Regulatory Economics 26(2): 201–229
Mahenc P., Salanie F. (2004). Softening competition through forward trading. Journal of Economic Theory 116, 282–293
Mansur E.T. (2007). Upstream competition and vertical integration in electricity markets. Journal of Law and Economics 50(1): 125–156
Newey W.K., West K.D. (1987). A simple positive definite, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix. Econometrica 55, 703–705
Newbery D. (1998). Competition, contracts and entry in the electricity spot market. RAND Journal of Economics 29(4): 726–749
Powell A. (1993). Trading forward in an imperfect market: The case of electricity in Britain. Economic Journal 103, 444–453
Shapiro C. (1989). Theories of oligopoly behavior. In: Schmalansee R., Willig R. (eds) Handbook of industrial organization (Vol. 1). New York, Elsevier Science Publishers