Of Marriage and Mathematics: Inferentialism and Social Ontology

Topoi - Tập 42 - Trang 247-257 - 2023
James Henry Collin1
1University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

Tóm tắt

The semantic inferentialist account of the social institution of semantic meaning can be naturally extended to account for social ontology. I argue here that semantic inferentialism provides a framework within which mathematical ontology can be understood as social ontology, and mathematical facts as socially instituted facts. I argue further that the semantic inferentialist framework provides resources to underpin at least some aspects of the objectivity of mathematics, even when the truth of mathematical claims is understood as socially instituted.

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