Lackey on group justified belief and evidence

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Jessica Brown1
1Arché Philosophical Research Centre, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK

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AbstractIn this paper, I examine one central strand of Lackey’s The Epistemology of Groups, namely her account of group justified belief and the puzzle cases she uses to develop it. Her puzzle cases involve a group of museum guards most of whom justifiably believe a certain claim but do so on different bases. Consideration of these cases leads her to hold that a group justifiably believes p if and only if (1) a significant proportion of its operative members (a) justifiably believe p on (b) bases that are consistent when combined and (2) the total evidence which members of the group do and should have had sufficiently support p. I question her judgement about these cases and condition 2, by examining the nature of group evidence as well as ‘transmission’ principles governing the relationship between the epistemic standing of members of a group and the group itself.

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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Sosa, E. (2010). Knowing full well. Princeton University Press.

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Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Tập 2 Số 2

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