Insufficient reasons insufficient to rescue the knowledge norm of practical reasoning: towards a certainty norm

Beddor, B. (2020). Certainty in action. Philosophical Quarterly, 70(281):711–737.

Brown, J. (2008). Subject-sensitive invariantism and the knowledge norm for practical reasoning. Noûs, 42, 167–189.

Brown, J. (2011). Fallibilism and the knowledge norm for assertion and practical reasoning. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (Eds.), Assertion: New philosophical essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Crisp, T. M. (2005). Hawthorne on knowledge and practical reasoning. Analysis, 65(2), 138–140.

Dancy, J. (2004). Ethics without principles. Oxford University Press.

DeRose, K. (2009). The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1. Oxford University Press.

Fantl, J., & McGrath, M. (2009). Knowledge in an uncertain world. Oxford University Press.

Fassio, D. (2017). Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning? Philosophical Studies, 174, 2137–2166

Gao, J. (2019). Against the iterated knowledge account of high-stakes cases. Episteme, 16(1), 92–107

Gerken, M. (2011). Warrant and action. Synthese, 178, 529–547

Gerken, M., & Petersen, E. N. (2020). Epistemic norms of assertion and action. In Sanford Goldberg (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harman, G. (1986). Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford University Press.

Hawthorne, J., & Stanley, J. (2008). Knowledge and action. Journal of Philosophy, 105, 571–590

Henning, T. (2021). An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning. Synthese, 199(3–4), 6665–6686

Ichikawa, J. J. (2012). Knowledge norms and acting well. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 1(1), 49–55

Kelp, C., & Simion, M. (2017). Criticism and blame in action and assertion. Journal of Philosophy, 114(2), 76–93

Kratzer, A. (1981). The notional category of modality. In H.-J. Eikmeyer & H. Rieser (Eds.), Words, worlds, and contexts: new approaches in word semantics. DeGruyte: Berlin and New York.

Locke, D. (2015). Practical certainty. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 90(1), 72–95

Neta, R. (2009). Treating something as a reason for action. Noûs, 43(4), 684–699

Reed, B. (2010). A defense of stable invariantism. Noûs, 44(2), 224–244

Skorupski, J. (2010). The domain of reasons. Oxford University Press.

Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and practical interests. Oxford University Press.

Vollet, J.-H. (2022). Epistemic excuses and the feeling of certainty. Analysis, 4, 663–672.

Vollet, J.-H. (2023). Antiluminosity, excuses and the sufficiency of knowledge for rational action. Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00682-7

Williamson, T. (2005). Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism and knowledge of knowledge. The Philosophical Quarterly, 55(219), 213–235

Williamson, T. (forthcoming). Justification, excuses, and sceptical scenarios. In F. Dorsch, & J. Dutant (Eds.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford University Press

Yalcin, S. (2007). Epistemic modals. Mind, 116, 983–1026.