How to stop the race to the bottom

International Tax and Public Finance - Tập 23 - Trang 911-933 - 2015
Anna Rauch1, Caroline-Antonia Hummel1
1FiFo Institute for Public Economics, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany

Tóm tắt

Standard tax multipliers are a widespread feature of fiscal equalization systems. A simple theoretical model shows that actual tax multipliers respond positively to changes in standard tax multipliers. This theoretical prediction is tested empirically using data on municipalities in Germany. A quasi-experiment in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia is exploited to identify the incentive effect. The empirical results confirm that local business tax policy is shaped by standard tax multipliers. They provide a straightforward practical tool to avoid a race to the bottom in local business tax rates.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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