Nội dung được dịch bởi AI, chỉ mang tính chất tham khảo
Khách hàng có được lợi từ cạnh tranh bán lẻ điện không?
Tóm tắt
So với quy định chi phí dịch vụ truyền thống, cạnh tranh bán lẻ điện có thể dẫn đến chi phí thấp hơn nhưng mức giá chênh lệch cao hơn. Do đó, tác động chính sách ròng đến giá bán lẻ điện trung bình là không xác định. Bài báo này sử dụng phương pháp chênh lệch trong chênh lệch để ước lượng tác động của chính sách đối với các bang của Hoa Kỳ đã tái cấu trúc thị trường bán lẻ điện. Kết quả cho thấy, tại các bang tái cấu trúc, chỉ có khách hàng cư trú là được hưởng lợi từ mức giá thấp hơn một cách đáng kể, trong khi khách hàng thương mại hoặc công nghiệp không được hưởng lợi. Hơn nữa, lợi ích này là tạm thời và biến mất trong dài hạn. Tóm lại, cạnh tranh bán lẻ dường như không mang lại mức giá điện thấp hơn cho các khách hàng bán lẻ trên diện rộng hoặc theo thời gian.
Từ khóa
#cạnh tranh bán lẻ điện #giá điện #tác động chính sách #khách hàng cư trú #khách hàng thương mại #khách hàng công nghiệp #Hoa KỳTài liệu tham khảo
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