Goodman and Putnam on the Making of Worlds

Annalen der Philosophie - Tập 58 - Trang 33-46 - 2003
Damian Cox1
1Department of Philosophy, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia

Tóm tắt

Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman are two of the twentieth century's most persuasive critics of metaphysical realism, however they disagree about the consequences of rejecting metaphysical realism. Goodman defended a view he called “irrealism” in which minds literally make worlds, and Putnam has sought to find a middle path between metaphysical realism and irrealism. I argue that Putnam's middle path turns out to be very elusive and defend a dichotomy between metaphysical realism and irrealism.

Tài liệu tham khảo

Goodman, N.: 1972, Problems and Projects, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis.

Goodman, N.: 1978, Ways of Worldmaking, Hackett, Press, Indianapolis.

Horwich, P.: 1996, 'Realism and Truth', Philosophical Perspectives 10, 187–197.

McCormick, P. J. (ed.): 1996, Starmaking: Realism, Anti-Realism and Irrealism, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Putnam, H.: 1978, Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Routledge, London.

Putnam, H.: 1981, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Putnam, H.: 1983, Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 3, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Putnam, H.: 1992, Renewing Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Putnam, H.: 1999, The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World, Columbia University Press, New York.

Scheffler, I.: 1996b, 'Reply to Goodman', in P. J. McCormick (ed.), Starmaking: Realism, Anti-Realism and Irrealism, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.