Full disclosure in competitive Bayesian persuasion
International Journal of Game Theory - Trang 1-21 - 2023
Tóm tắt
This paper studies a Bayesian persuasion game in which a receiver can receive signals from two senders. We study under what circumstances the competition between senders induces them to fully disclose all of the signals available. We find that if the senders’ preferences are such that they are opposite to the same degree across states (to be made precise in the paper), full disclosure is the only equilibrium outcome of the game. Furthermore, we find that the above condition on the senders’ preferences is also necessary if we require that full disclosure be the only equilibrium outcome for any receiver’s utility and any information environment.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Kamenica E, Gentzkow M (2011) Bayesian Persuasion. Am Econ Rev 101:2590–2615