Nội dung được dịch bởi AI, chỉ mang tính chất tham khảo
Phân cấp Tài chính: Giải pháp cho Tham nhũng?
Tóm tắt
Bài báo này xem xét ảnh hưởng của phân cấp tài chính trong một quốc gia đối với mức độ tham nhũng. Sử dụng khung tranh cạnh thuế với hành vi tìm kiếm lợi nhuận, bài viết cho thấy về lý thuyết rằng phân cấp tài chính, được mô hình hóa như việc gia tăng số lượng các khu vực tài phán cạnh tranh, dẫn đến mức độ tham nhũng thấp hơn. Kết quả này sau đó được kiểm nghiệm bằng cách sử dụng một bộ dữ liệu nhỏ, xuyên quốc gia. Các kết quả thực nghiệm không quá mạnh, nhưng chúng gợi ý rằng mối quan hệ giả thuyết giữa phân cấp và tham nhũng có thể thực sự tồn tại.
Từ khóa
#phân cấp tài chính #tham nhũng #cạnh tranh thuế #khu vực tài phán #hành vi tìm kiếm lợi nhuậnTài liệu tham khảo
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