First-price auctions on general preference domains: axiomatic characterizations
Tóm tắt
In a single-item auction with agents having general preferences, first-price auctions are axiomatically characterized. In this study, we characterize first-price auctions by Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, anonymity in welfare, and non-bossiness in welfare. The first three properties are satisfied by second-price auctions. Considering the well-known fact that second-price auctions are strategy-proof, a clear distinction between first- and second-price auctions is reducible to the difference between non-bossiness and strategy-proofness, both of which are important properties with respect to agents’ strategic behavior. In the characterization, anonymity in welfare can be replaced by envy-freeness, which is also a basic property related to equity among agents. Furthermore, in our characterization, each of the properties, Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and non-bossiness in welfare, is independent, and domains on which first-price auctions are characterized without equity properties are specified. By strengthening non-bossiness, we characterize first-price auctions by a weaker equity property called equal welfare to equals.
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