Exit rights open complex pathways to cooperation

Journal of the Royal Society Interface - Tập 18 Số 174 - Trang 20200777 - 2021
Chen Shen1,2, Marko Jusup2, Лей Ши1, Zhen Wang3, Matjaž Perc4,5,6, Petter Holme2
1School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, People's Republic of China
2Tokyo Tech World Hub Research Initiative, Institute of Innovative Research, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo 152-8550, Japan
3Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL) and School of Mechanical Engineering, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, People's Republic of China
4Complexity Science Hub Vienna, 1080 Vienna, Austria
5Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University, Taichung 404332, Taiwan
6Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia

Tóm tắt

We study the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which cooperators and defectors interact with another actor type called exiters. Rather than being exploited by defectors, exiters exit the game in favour of a small pay-off. We find that this simple extension of the game allows cooperation to flourish in well-mixed populations when iterations or reputation are added. In networked populations, however, the exit option is less conducive to cooperation. Instead, it enables the coexistence of cooperators, defectors, and exiters through cyclic dominance. Other outcomes are also possible as the exit pay-off increases or the network structure changes, including network-wide oscillations in actor abundances that may cause the extinction of exiters and the domination of defectors, although game parameters should favour exiting. The complex dynamics that emerges in the wake of a simple option to exit the game implies that nuances matter even if our analyses are restricted to incentives for rational behaviour.

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Journal of the Royal Society Interface

Tập 18 Số 174

20200777

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