Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player

Journal of Applied Probability - Tập 16 Số 1 - Trang 76-83 - 1979
Peter Taylor1
1Queen's University

Tóm tắt

A definition of ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) is suggested for games in which there are two types of player, each with its own set of strategies, and the fitness of any strategy depends upon the strategy mix, of both types, in the population as a whole. We check that the standard ESS results hold for this definition and discuss a mate-desertion model which has appeared in the literature in which the two types are male and female.

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