Dynamics of cooperative games

International Journal of Game Theory - Tập 5 - Trang 27-64 - 1976
J. H. Grotte1
1Institute for Defense Analyses, Arlington

Tóm tắt

Systems of differential equations are exhibited, the solutions of which converge to optimal points, some of which are shown to coincide with classical solution concepts, to wit, the core, the Shapley value, and, under certain conditions, the Nucleolus.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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International Journal of Game Theory

Tập 5

27-64

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