Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition

Perspectives on Psychological Science - Tập 8 Số 3 - Trang 223-241 - 2013
Evan Heit1, Keith E. Stanovich2
1School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, England
2Department of Applied Psychology and Human Development, University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada

Tóm tắt

Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.

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