Do transactions to tax havens and corruption attract officially supported export credit? Evidence from three European export credit agencies
Tóm tắt
OECD governments provide billions in export credit annually in support of national exporters to developing countries. Linked to the OECD-recommendation on anti-bribery and export credits, the research focuses on whether support of the export credit agencies is dependent on the corruption levels and so called ‘tax haven’ status of the countries to which the exports are destined. We compose a unique panel data set based on data on the export credit agencies of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden. We find that corruption levels in the countries to which the exports are destined do not have an influence on the presence and level of export credits. Conversely, whether the destination country of the export is a ‘tax haven’ is important: British and Dutch agencies are significantly more likely to provide export credit for export transactions to tax havens than for non-tax-havens, all else being equal. This declines for the Netherlands over time. The results indicate that the chances that the United Kingdom Export Finance supports transactions with EC to a tax haven are 12 times more likely than for a non-tax haven countries, all else being equal. In the Netherlands, this is 3 times more likely. Based on the findings, we recommend that export credit agencies and their financial backers be extra vigilant in their due diligence policies, especially with respect to ‘tax havens’ and make these policies publicly available.
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