Nội dung được dịch bởi AI, chỉ mang tính chất tham khảo
Liệu sở thích của chính phủ có ảnh hưởng đến cạnh tranh thuế?
Tóm tắt
Bài báo này khám phá cách thức sở thích của chính phủ ảnh hưởng đến quyết định thuế vốn của một quốc gia. Chúng tôi phát triển một mô hình trong đó các chính phủ, khác biệt trong sở thích về phát triển kinh tế và bình đẳng thu nhập, cạnh tranh để thu hút vốn di động thông qua thuế doanh nghiệp. Dự đoán chính của mô hình, được chứng minh qua dữ liệu từ các quốc gia OECD trong giai đoạn 1990–2012, cho thấy rằng sự gia tăng sở thích của chính phủ trong việc theo đuổi phát triển kinh tế so với bình đẳng thu nhập khiến các phản ứng thuế ngang hàng của các quốc gia trở nên mạnh mẽ hơn. Khác với các nghiên cứu hiện có, kết quả của chúng tôi góp phần vào tài liệu về cạnh tranh thuế bằng cách nhấn mạnh tầm quan trọng của sở thích chính phủ trong việc xác định mức độ cạnh tranh thuế giữa các quốc gia, từ đó cung cấp một lời giải thích mới cho sự khác biệt thuế mà chúng ta thường thấy ở các quốc gia.
Từ khóa
#sở thích của chính phủ #cạnh tranh thuế #thuế doanh nghiệp #phát triển kinh tế #bình đẳng thu nhậpTài liệu tham khảo
Alesina, A., & Angeletos, G.-M. (2005). Fairness and redistribution. American Economic Review, 95(4), 960–980.
Alesina, A., & Ferrara, E. L. (2005). Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities. Journal of Public Economics, 89(5–6), 897–931.
Alesina, A., Glaeser, E., & Sacerdote, B. (2001). Why doesn’t the United States have a European-style welfare state? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 32(2), 187–278.
Anselin, L. (1988). Spatial econometrics: methods and models. Studies in operational regional science. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277–297.
Baldwin, R. E., & Krugman, P. (2004). Agglomeration, integration and tax harmonisation. European Economic Review, 48(1), 1–23.
Becker, J., & Runkel, M. (2012). Even small trade costs restore efficiency in tax competition. Journal of Urban Economics, 72(2–3), 191–195.
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115–143.
Brueckner, J. K. (2003). Strategic interaction among governments: An overview of empirical studies. International Regional Science Review, 26(2), 175–188.
Bucovetsky, S. (1991). Asymmetric tax competition. Journal of Urban Economics, 30(2), 167–181.
Bucovetsky, S., & Haufler, A. (2007). Preferential tax regimes with asymmetric countries. National Tax Journal, 60, 789–796.
Bucovetsky, S., Marchand, M., & Pestieau, P. (1998). Tax competition and revelation of preferences for public expenditure. Journal of Urban Economics, 44(3), 367–390.
Cai, H., & Treisman, D. (2005). Does competition for capital discipline governments? Decentralization, globalization, and public policy. The American Economic Review, 95(3), 817–830.
Devereux, M., & Griffith, R. (1998). The taxation of discrete investment choices. IFS working papers W98/16, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
Devereux, M., & Griffith, R. (2003). Evaluating tax policy for location decisions. International Tax and Public Finance, 10, 107–126.
Devereux, M. P., Griffith, R., & Klemm, A. (2002). Corporate income tax reforms and international tax competition. Economic Policy, 17(35), 449–495.
Devereux, M. P., Lockwood, B., & Redoano, M. (2008). Do countries compete over corporate tax rates? Journal of Public Economics, 92(5–6), 1210–1235.
Dharmapala, D., & Hines, J. R. (2009). Which countries become tax havens? Journal of Public Economics, 93(9–10), 1058–1068.
Elschner, C., & Vanborren, W. (2009). Corporate effective tax rates in an enlarged European Union. Taxation papers 14. Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission.
EU Commission. (2001). Company taxation in the internal market. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Fong, C. (2001). Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution. Journal of Public Economics, 82(2), 225–246.
Foucault, M., Madies, T., & Paty, S. (2008). Public spending interactions and local politics: Empirical evidence from French municipalities. Public Choice, 137(1), 57–80.
Ghinamo, M., Panteghini, P., & Revelli, F. (2010). FDI determination and corporate tax competition in a volatile world. International Tax and Public Finance, 17(5), 532–555.
Greene, W. H. (2003). Econometric analysis (Vol. 5). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2003). People’s opium? Religion and economic attitudes. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(1), 225–282.
Haufler, A., & Wooton, I. (1999). Country size and tax competition for foreign direct investment. Journal of Public Economics, 71(1), 121–139.
Hindriks, J., Peralta, S., & Weber, S. (2008). Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization. Journal of Public Economics, 92(12), 2392–2402.
Ivanyna, M. (2010). Quality of governance and its impact on interjurisdictional competition. Ph.D. thesis, Universität Regensburg.
Jacobs, J., Ligthart, J., & Vrijburg, H. (2010). Consumption tax competition among governments: Evidence from the United States. International Tax and Public Finance, 17, 271–294.
Kächelein, H. (2014). Asymmetric capital tax competition and choice of tax rate. International Tax and Public Finance, 21(1), 50–65.
Kelejian, H. H., & Prucha, I. R. (1998). A generalized spatial two-stage least squares procedure for estimating a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 17, 99–121.
Kelejian, H. H., & Robinson, D. P. (1993). A suggested method of estimation for spatial interdependent models with autocorrelated errors, and an application to a county expenditure model. Papers in Regional Science, 72, 297–312.
Kind, H. J., Knarvik, K. H. M., & Schjelderup, G. (2000). Competing for capital in a ‘lumpy’ world. Journal of Public Economics, 78(3), 253–274.
Klemm, A., & Van Parys, S. (2012). Empirical evidence on the effects of tax incentives. International Tax and Public Finance, 19, 393–423.
Koethenbuerger, M. (2014). Competition for migrants in a federation: Tax or transfer competition? Journal of Urban Economics, 80, 110–118.
Liu, Y. (2014). Does competition for capital discipline governments? The role of fiscal equalization. International Tax and Public Finance, 21(3), 345–374.
Loretz, S. (2008). Corporate taxation in the OECD in a wider context. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 24(4), 639–660.
Ludema, R. D., & Wooton, I. (2000). Economic geography and the fiscal effects of regional integration. Journal of International Economics, 52(2), 331–357.
Marceau, N., Mongrain, S., & Wilson, J. D. (2010). Why do most countries set high tax rates on capital? Journal of International Economics, 80(2), 249–259.
Matsumoto, M. (2008). Redistribution and regional development under tax competition. Journal of Urban Economics, 64(2), 480–487.e1.
Nickell, S. (1981). Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica, 49(6), 1417–1426.
Roodman, D. (2009a). How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata. Stata Journal, 9(1), 86–136.
Roodman, D. (2009b). A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 71(1), 135–158.
Wilson, J. D. (1986). A theory of interregional tax competition. Journal of Urban Economics, 19(3), 296–315.
Wilson, J. D. (1991). Tax competition with interregional differences in factor endowments. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 21(3), 423–451.
Wilson, J. D. (1999). Theories of tax competition. National Tax Journal, 52, 269–304.
Wilson, J. D., & Wildasin, D. E. (2004). Capital tax competition: Bane or boon. Journal of Public Economics, 88(6), 1065–1091.
Winner, H. (2005). Has tax competition emerged in OECD countries? Evidence from panel data. International Tax and Public Finance, 12(5), 667–687.
Zissimos, B., & Wooders, M. (2008). Public good differentiation and the intensity of tax competition. Journal of Public Economics, 92(5–6), 1105–1121.
Zodrow, G. R., & Mieszkowski, P. (1986). Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods. Journal of Urban Economics, 19(3), 356–370.