Distortionary taxation and the free-rider problem
Tóm tắt
This paper derives a version of the Samuelson rule which takes into account that a distortionary Ramsey-tax system is used to finance public-goods provision. Individuals have private information about their public-goods preferences. Moreover, individuals differ in their productive abilities. The incidence of taxation in the Ramsey model implies that more productive individuals have a lower willingness to pay for public goods than less productive individuals. They are therefore tempted to understate their valuation of public goods and less productive individuals are inclined to exaggerate theirs. The paper characterizes an optimal rule for taxation and public-goods provision that eliminates these biases.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Atkinson, A., & Stern, N. (1974). Pigou, taxation and public goods. Review of Economic Studies, 41, 119–128.
Bierbrauer, F. (2008). A unified approach to the revelation of public goods preferences and to optimal income taxation. Preprint 2008/39, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn.
Bierbrauer, F. (2009). Optimal income taxation and public-good provision with endogenous interest groups. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11, 311–342.
Boadway, R., & Keen, M. (1993). Public goods, self-selection and optimal income taxation. International Economic Review, 34, 463–478.
Clarke, E. (1971). Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11, 17–33.
Gahvari, F. (2006). On the marginal costs of public funds and the optimal provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 90, 1251–1262.
Gaube, T. (2000). When do distortionary taxes reduce the optimal supply of public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 76, 151–180.
Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41, 617–663.
Guesnerie, R. (1995). A contribution to the pure theory of taxation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hellwig, M. (1986). The optimal linear income tax revisited. Journal of Public Economics, 31, 163–179.
Hellwig, M. (2003). Public-good provision with many participants. Review of Economic Studies, 70, 589–614.
Ledyard, J., & Palfrey, T. (2002). The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes. Journal of Public Economics, 83, 153–171.
Mirrlees, J. (1971). An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. Review of Economic Studies, 38, 175–208.
Sheshinski, E. (1972). The optimal linear income-tax. Review of Economic Studies, 39, 297–302.
Wilson, J. (1991). Optimal public-good provision with limited lump-sum taxation. American Economic Review, 81, 153–166.