Coordination of Supply Chains with Risk‐Averse Agents

Production and Operations Management - Tập 13 Số 2 - Trang 135-149 - 2004
Xianghua Gan1, Suresh Sethi1, Houmin Yan1
1Department of Information Systems and Operations Management, The University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas, Texas 75083, USA

Tóm tắt

The extant supply chain management literature has not addressed the issue of coordination in supply chains involving risk‐averse agents. We take up this issue and begin with defining a coordinating contract as one that results in a Pareto‐optimal solution acceptable to each agent. Our definition generalizes the standard one in the risk‐neutral case. We then develop coordinating contracts in three specific cases: (i) the supplier is risk neutral and the retailer maximizes his expected profit subject to a downside risk constraint; (ii) the supplier and the retailer each maximizes his own mean‐variance trade‐off; and (iii) the supplier and the retailer each maximizes his own expected utility. Moreover, in case (iii), we show that our contract yields the Nash Bargaining solution. In each case, we show how we can find the set of Pareto‐optimal solutions, and then design a contract to achieve the solutions. We also exhibit a case in which we obtain Pareto‐optimal sharing rules explicitly, and outline a procedure to obtain Pareto‐optimal solutions.

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

10.1287/msom.2.4.410.12339

10.1080/07408170008967441

Arrow K. J., 1951, Social choice and individule values

10.1287/opre.40.3.603

Buzacott J., 2001, Optimality criteria and risk analysis in inventory models with demand forecast updating

Cachon G., 2002, Supply chain coordination with revenue‐sharing contracts: strengths and limitations

Cachon G., 2002, Supply chain coordination with contracts

Chen F., 2000, Mean‐variance analysis of basic inventory models

Chen X., 2003, Risk aversion in inventory management

Chopra S., 2001, Supply chain management

10.1287/mnsc.41.5.786

10.1287/mnsc.27.11.1221

Gan X., 2003, Channel coordination with a riskneutral supplier and a downside‐risk‐averse retailer

Gaur V., 2003, Hedging inventory risk through market instruments

10.1086/257678

10.1017/CBO9780511571756

Jorion P., 2001, Value at Risk

Lavalle I. H., 1978, Fundamentals of Decision Analysis

Lau H. S., 1980, Journal of Operations Research Society, 31, 393, 10.1057/jors.1980.72

10.1016/S0377-2217(98)00123-4

Levi H., 1979, American Economic Review, 69, 308

Markowitz H., 1959, Portfolio selection: Efficient diversification of investment

Nagarajan M., 2003, A bargaining framework in supply chains

10.2307/1907266

10.1287/mksc.4.2.166

10.2307/1913738

Raiffa H., 1970, Decision analysis

10.1287/mnsc.46.3.404.12070

Szegö G., 2004, New risk measures for the 21st century

10.1007/978-1-4615-4949-9

10.1016/S0022-4359(02)00070-2

10.1287/msom.5.4.269.24882

vanNeumann J., 1944, Theory of games and economic behavior

Wilson R., 1968, Econometrica, 18, 155

Thông tin
Thông tin xuất bản

Production and Operations Management

Tập 13 Số 2

135-149

Thông tin tác giả