Constitution, evidence, and an argument for realism: responses to Bird’s Knowing Science
Tóm tắt
What sorts of aims, or goals, are constitutive of science? How does scientific evidence relate to the knowledge that science produces? And can the No Miracles Argument for scientific realism be defended against concerns about the explanatory capacity of truth? In Knowing Science, Bird engages with questions like these at length. In this paper, I engage with these questions too. I raise some concerns for the view that aiming at knowledge is constitutive of science. I provide three counterexamples to an epistemic principle which Bird uses to argue for the view that evidence is knowledge. And I formulate a version of the No Miracles Argument which, by basing realism on a particular approach to meaning and to the empirical science of linguistics, avoids any mention of truth whatsoever.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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