Quy định kiểu chỉ huy và kiểm soát, động lực giảm ô nhiễm và cấu trúc thị trường

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 57 - Trang 159-180 - 2020
Ping Lin1,2, Yu Pang3
1Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
2School of Economics, Shandong University, Jinan, China
3School of Business, Macau University of Science and Technology, Taipa, Macau

Tóm tắt

Bài báo này phân tích tác động của quy định kiểu chỉ huy và kiểm soát đối với động lực của các doanh nghiệp trong việc giảm thiểu ô nhiễm, cấu trúc thị trường và phúc lợi xã hội. Chúng tôi xem xét quy định mà theo đó các doanh nghiệp không được phép sản xuất nếu bị phát hiện không tuân thủ tiêu chuẩn phát thải đã được thiết lập trong quá trình kiểm tra không hoàn hảo của chính phủ. Trong trường hợp độc quyền trước, tiêu chuẩn lỏng lẻo kết hợp với kiểm tra nghiêm ngặt có thể tạo ra sự tuân thủ hoàn hảo. Trong trường hợp độc quyền song hành, kiểm tra tăng cường trực tiếp tạo ra rào cản gia nhập thị trường, nhưng nó cũng kích thích các doanh nghiệp tăng đầu tư vào việc giảm thiểu ô nhiễm để tuân thủ môi trường tốt hơn, qua đó gián tiếp thúc đẩy cạnh tranh trên thị trường. Hơn nữa, một doanh nghiệp sẽ đầu tư nhiều hơn vào việc giảm thiểu ô nhiễm nếu nó ban đầu sạch hơn hoặc hiệu quả sản xuất hơn so với đối thủ, hoặc nếu nó có ít đối thủ tiềm năng hơn. Chúng tôi cũng phát hiện rằng việc siết chặt quy định có thể gây hại cho phúc lợi xã hội bằng cách giảm xác suất gia nhập thị trường, và phúc lợi xã hội có thể cao hơn trong trường hợp độc quyền so với độc quyền song hành khi việc kiểm tra của chính phủ đủ nghiêm ngặt.

Từ khóa

#quy định kiểu chỉ huy và kiểm soát #động lực giảm ô nhiễm #cấu trúc thị trường #phúc lợi xã hội

Tài liệu tham khảo

Arguedas, C. (2008). To comply or not to comply? pollution standard setting under costly monitoring and sanctioning. Environmental and Resource Economics, 41(2), 155–168. Arguedas, C. (2013). Pollution standards, technology investment and fines for non-compliance. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 44(2), 156–176. Arguedas, C., Cabo, F., & Martín-Herrán, G. (2020). Enforcing regulatory standards in stock pollution problems. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (in press). Arguedas, C., Camacho, E., & Zofío, J. L. (2010). Environmental policy instruments: Technology adoption incentives with imperfect compliance. Environmental and Resource Economics, 47(2), 261–274. Becker, R. A., & Henderson, V. (2000). Effects of air quality regulations on polluting industries. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2), 379–421. Blair, B. F., & Hite, D. (2005). The impact of environmental regulations on the industry structure of landfills. Growth and Change, 36(4), 529–550. Clarkson, R., & Deyes, K. (2002). Estimating the social cost of carbon emissions. London: HM Treasury. Dean, T. J., & Brown, R. L. (2000). Environmental regulation as a barrier to the formation of small manufacturing establishments: A longitudinal examination. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 40, 56–75. Deily, M. E., & Gray, W. B. (2007). Agency structure and firm culture: OSHA, EPA, and the steel industry. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23(3), 685–709. Directive, RoHS. (2003). Directive 2002/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment. Official Journal of the European Union, 13, L37. Earnhart, D. (2004). Panel data analysis of regulatory factors shaping environmental performance. Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(1), 391–401. Evans, J. (2012). Environmental governance. New York: Routledge. Farzin, Y. H. (2003). The effects of emissions standards on industry. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 24(3), 315–327. Golombek, R., & Raknerud, A. (1997). Do environmental standards harm manufacturing employment? Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99(1), 29–44. Goulder, L. H., Hafstead, M., & Williams III, R. C. (2016). General equilibrium impacts of a federal clean energy standard. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 8(2), 186–218. Gray, W. B., & Shimshack, J. P. (2011). The effectiveness of environmental monitoring and enforcement: A review of the empirical evidence. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 5(1), 3–24. Hahn, R. W., & Axtell, R. L. (1995). Reevaluating the relationship between transferable property rights and command-and-control regulation. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 8(2), 125–148. Hahn, R. W., & Stavins, R. N. (1992). Economic incentives for environmental protection: Integrating theory and practice. American Economic Review, 82(2), 464–468. Harrington, W., & Morgenstern, R. D. (2007). Economic incentives versus command and control: What’s the best approach for solving environmental problems? In G. R. Visgilio & D. M. Whitelaw (Eds.), Acid in the Environment: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects (pp. 233–240). US: Springer. Harrison, K., & Antweiler, W. (2003). Incentives for pollution abatement: Regulation, regulatory threats, and non-governmental pressures. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 22(3), 361–382. Hettige, H., Huq, M., Pargal, S., & Wheeler, D. (1996). Determinants of pollution abatement in developing countries: evidence from South and Southeast Asia. World Development, 24(12), 1891–1904. Holland, S. P., Hughes, J. E., & Knittel, C. R. (2009). Greenhouse gas reductions under low carbon fuel standards? American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 1(1), 106–146. Holland, S. P., & Andrew, J. Y. (2015). Optimal trading ratios for pollution permit markets. Journal of Public Economics, 125(C), 16–27. Jiang, L., Lin, C., & Lin, P. (2014). The determinants of pollution levels: Firm-level evidence from Chinese manufacturing. Journal of Comparative Economics, 42(1), 118–142. Kellenberg, D. K. (2009). An empirical investigation of the pollution haven effect with strategic environment and trade policy. Journal of International Economics, 78(2), 242–255. Kuran, T., & Sunstein, C. R. (1999). Availability cascades and risk regulation. Stanford Law Review, 51(4), 683–768. Magat, W., & Viscusi, K. (1990). Effectiveness of the EPA’s regulatory enforcement: The case of industrial effluent standards. Journal of Law and Economics, 33(2), 331–360. Malik, A. S. (1990). Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 18(2), 97–106. Millimet, D., Roy, S., & Sengupta, A. (2009). Environmental regulations and economic activity: Influence on market structure. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 1, 99–118. Montero, J.-P. (2002). Permits, standards, and technology innovation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 44, 23–44. OECD. (2006). “Environmental Regulation and Competition.” ODAF/COMP(2006)30. Pack, H., & Saggi, K. (2006). Is there a case for industrial policy? A critical survey. World Bank Research Observer, 21, 267–297. Pang, Y. (2019). Taxing pollution and profits: A bargaining approach. Energy Economics, 78, 278–288. Phaneuf, D. J., & Requate, T. (2017). A course in environmental economics: Theory, policy, and practice. New York, U.S.: Cambridge University Press. Poelhekke, S., & Ploeg, F. (2015). Green havens and pollution havens. World Economy, 38(7), 1159–1178. Rousseau, S., & Proost, S. (2005). Comparing environmental policy instruments in the presence of imperfect compliance - A case study. Environmental and Resource Economics, 32(3), 337–365. Ryan, S. P. (2012). The costs of environmental regulation in a concentrated industry. Econometrica, 80(3), 1019–1061. Smith, M. (2012). Environmental and Health Regulation in the United States and the European Union. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Snyder, L. D., Miller, N. H., & Stavins, R. N. (2003). The effects of environmental regulation on technology diffusion: The case of chlorine manufacturing. American Economic Review, 93(2), 431–435. Sugathan, A., Bhangale, R., Kansal, V., & Hulke, U. (2018). How can indian power plants cost-effectively meet the new sulfur emission standards? Policy evaluation using marginal abatement cost-curves. Energy Policy, 121, 124–137. Telle, K. (2013). Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations lessons from a natural field experiment in Norway. Journal of Public Economics, 99, 24–34. U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO). (2001). The Code of Federal Regulations of the United States of America, Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Adminstration. Washington DC, USA. Wang, H. (2000). Pollution regulation and abatement efforts: Evidence from China. Ecological Economics, 41, 85–94. Wang, H., & Jin, Y. (2007). Industrial ownership and environmental performance: Evidence from China. Environmental and Resource Economics, 36(3), 255–273. Williams, R. C, I. I. I. (2017). Environmental taxation. In J. Auerbach Alan & K. Smetters (Eds.), The economics of tax policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zhao, J. (2018). “Aggregate emission intensity targets: applications to the Paris Agreement.” ADBI Working Paper 813. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute.