Carnap as a Beall-style logical monist

Beall, J. (2017). There is no logical negation: True, false, both, and neither. The Australasian Journal of Logic, 14(1), 1–29.

Beall, J. (2018). The simple argument for subclassical logic. Nous- Supplement: Philosophical Issues, 28(1), 30–54.

Beall, J., & Restall, G. (1998). Logical pluralism. Australian. Journal of Philosophy, 78(4), 475–493.

Beall, J. C., & Restall, G. (2001). Defending logical pluralism. In J. H. Woods & B. Brown (Eds.), S. of Exact Philosophy Logical consequences: Rival approaches (pp. 1–21). Hermes Science.

Beall, J., & Restall, G. (2006). Logical pluralism. Clarendon Press Oxford.

Broughton, G. L. (2021). Carnapian frameworks. Synthese, 199, 4097–4126.

Carnap, R. (1937). The logical syntax of language. Harcourt, Brace and Company.

Carnap, R. (1947). Meaning and necessity - A study in semantics and modal logic. University of Chicago.

Carnap, R. (1950). Empiricism, semantics and ontology. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4(11), 20–40. 

Cook, R. T. (2010). Let a thousand flowers bloom: a tour of logical pluralism. Philosophy Compass, 5(6), 492–504.

Devidi, D., & Solomon, G. (1995). Tolerance and metalanguages in Carnap’slogical syntax of language. Synthese, 103(1), 123–139.

Dicher, B., & Paoli, F. (2021). The original sin of proof-theoretic semantics. Synthese, 198(1), 615–640.

Eklund, M. (2009). Carnap and ontological pluralism. In D. J. Chalmers, D. Manley, & R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New essays on the foundations of ontology (pp. 130–156). Oxford University Press.

Friedman, M. (2001). Tolerance and analyticty in Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics. In J. Floyd & S. Shieh (Eds.), Future pasts: The analytic tradition in twentieth-century philosophy (pp. 223–255). Oxford Univeristy Press.

Keefe, R. (2013). What logical pluralism cannot be. Synthese, 191, 1357–1390.

Kouri, T. (2016). A new interpretation of Carnap’s logical pluralism. Topoi, 38, 305–314

Marschall, B. (2022). Carnap’s philosophy of mathematics. Philosophy Compass, 17 (11).

Priest, G. (1987). Doubt truth to be a liar. Oxford University Press.

Read, S. (2006). Monism: The one true logic. In D. Devidi & T. Kenyon (Eds.), A Logical approach to philosophy the western Ontario series (pp. 193–209). Springer.

Restall, G. (2002). Carnap’s tolerance, language change and logical pluralism. Journal of Philosophy, 99, 426–443.

Russell, G. (2013). In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Logical pluralism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 201 ed.).

Schilpp, P. A. (1963). The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (Vol. XI). Open Court.

Shapiro, S. (2014). Varieties of logic. Oxford University Press. 

Steinberger, F. (2015). How tolerant can you be? Carnap on rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2009, 1–24.

Yap, A. (2010). Feminism and Carnap’s principle of tolerance. Hypatia, 25(2), 437–454.