Transaction cost economics and its uses in marketing
Tóm tắt
Từ khóa
Tài liệu tham khảo
Anderson, E. M. (1982). Contracting the selling function: The salesperson as outside agent or employee. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, United States.
Anderson, E. M. (1985). The salesperson as outside agent or employee: a transaction cost analysis. Marketing Science, 4, 234–254.
Anderson, E. M. (1988a). Transaction costs as determinants of opportunism in integrated and independent sales forces. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 9, 247–264.
Anderson, E. M. (1988b). Strategic implications of Darwinian economics for selling efficiency and choice of integrated or independent sales forces. Management Science, 34(5), 599–618.
Anderson, E. M., & Gatignon, H. (1986). Modes of foreign entry: a transaction cost analysis and propositions. Journal of International Business Studies, 11, 1–26.
Anderson, E. M., & Schmittlein, D. (1984). Integration of the sales force: an empirical examination. The Rand Journal of Economics, 15(Autumn), 385–395.
Anderson, E. M., & Robertson, T. (1995). Inducing multi-line salespeople to adopt house brands. Journal of Marketing, 59(April), 16–31.
Arrow, K. J. (1969). The organization of economic activity: Issues pertinent to the choice of market versus nonmarket allocation. In The analysis and evaluation of public expenditure: The PPB system. Vol. 1, U.S. Joint Economic Committee, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 59–73. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Barnard, C. (1938). The functions of the executive. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (fifteenth printing, 1962).
Bolton, P., & Dewatripont, M. (2005). Contract theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Carson, S. J. (2000). Managing creativity and innovation in high-technology interfirm relationship. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, United States.
Coase, R. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405. Reprinted in O. E. Williamson and S. Winter (Eds), 1991, The nature of the firm: Origins, evolution, development (pp. 18–33). New York: Oxford University Press.
Coase, R. (1993). Coase on posner on coase. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 149, 96–98.
Coase, R. (1972). Industrial organization: A proposal for research. In V. R. Fuchs (Ed.), Policy issues and research opportunities in industrial organization (pp. 59–73). New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Commons, J. R. (1932). The problems of correlating law, economics, and ethics. Wisconsin Law Review, 8, 3–26.
Coughlan, A. T., Anderson, E. M., Stern, L. W., & El-Ansary, A. I. (2006). Marketing channels (7th ed.). Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Dixit, A. (1996). The making of economic policy: A transaction cost politics perspective. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Dutta, S. (1990). The influence of buyer switching costs on second-sourcing: theoretical analysis and experimental evidence. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, United States.
Elster, J. (1994). Arguing and bargaining in two constituent assemblies, upublished manuscript, remarks given at the University of California, Berkeley.
Friedman, M. (1997). In B. Snowdon and H. Vane, “Modern macroeconomics and its evolution from a monetarist perspective”. Journal of Economic Studies, 24(4), 191–221.
Gatignon, A., & Gatignon, H. (2010). Erin Anderson and the path breaking work of TCE in new areas of business research: transaction costs in action. Journal of Retailing, 86(3), 232–247.
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1971). The entropy law and economic process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.-B. E. M., & Kumar, N. (2006). Make, buy, or ally: a meta-analysis of transaction cost theory. Academy of Management Journal, 49(3), 519–543.
Ghosh, M., & John, G. (2009). When should original equipment manufacturers use branded component contracts with suppliers? Journal of Marketing Research, 46(October), 597–611.
Goldberg, V. (1976). Toward an expanded economic theory of contract. Journal of Economics Issues, 10(March), 45–61.
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94(August), 691–719.
Guiltinan, J. P. (1974). Planned and evolutionary changes in distribution channels. Journal of Retailing, 50, 74–79.
Hayek, F. A. (1945). The uses of knowledge in society. American Economic Review, 35(September), 519–530.
Heide, J. B. (1987). Explaining ‘Closeness’ in industrial purchasing relationships: The effects of dependency symmetry on inter-organizational coordination patterns. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, United States.
Heide, J. B., & John, G. (1990). Alliances in industrial purchasing: the determinants of joint action in buyer-seller relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 27, 24–36.
Henisz, W. J., & Macher, J. T. (2004). Firm- and country-level tradeoffs and contingencies in the evaluation of foreign investment: the semiconductor industry, 1994–2002. Organization Science, 15(5), 537–554.
Jap, S. D., & Anderson, E. (2007). Safeguarding interorganizational performance and continuity under ex post opportunism. Management Science, 49, 1684–1701.
John, G., & Reve, T. (2010). Transaction cost analysis in marketing: looking back, moving forward. Journal of Retailing, 86(3), 248–256.
John, G., & Weitz, B. A. (1988). Forward integration into distribution: an empirical test of transaction cost analysis. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 4(Fall), 121–139.
Joskow, P. L. (1985). Vertical integration and long-term contracts. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1(Spring), 33–80.
Joskow, P. L. (1987). Contract duration and relationship-specific investments. The American Economic Review, 77(March), 168–185.
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., & Alchian, A. A. (1978). Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. Journal of Law and Economics, 21(2), 297–326.
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981). The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance. Journal of Political Economy, 89(August), 615–641.
Kreps, D. M. (1999). Markets and hierarchies and (Mathematical) economic theory. In G. Carroll & D. Teece (Eds.), Firms, markets, and hierarchies (pp. 121–155). New York: Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Macher, J. T., & Richman, B. D. (2008). Transaction cost economics: an assessment of empirical research in the social sciences. Business and Politics, 10(1), 1–63.
Masten, S. (1984). The organization of production: evidence from the aerospace industry. Journal of Law and Economics, 27(October), 403–418.
Masten, S., & Crocker, K. (1985). Efficient adaptation in long term contracts: take or pay provisions for natural gas. The American Economic Review, 75(December), 1085–1096.
Monteverde, K., & Teece, D. (1982). Supplier switching costs and vertical integration in the automobile industry. Bell Journal of Economics, 13(Spring), 206–213.
Newell, A. (1990). United theories of cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Noordweier, T. G. (1986). Explaining contract purchase arrangements in industrial buying: A transaction cost perspective,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, WI, United States.
Ouchi, W. G. (1977). Review of markets and hierarchies. Administrative Science Quarterly, 22(September), 541–544.
Posner, R. A. (1972). The appropriate scope of regulation in the cable television industry. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 3, 98–129.
Rao, R. S. (2009). Estimating the costs of mistaken governance: The cost of salesforce compensation, Working Paper, Marketing Department, University of Texas, Austin, United States.
Rindfleisch, A., & Heide, J. B. (1997). Transaction cost analysis: past, present and future applications. Journal of Marketing, 61(4), 30–51.
Rindfleisch, A., Antia, K., Bercovitz, J., Brown, J. R., Cannon, J., Carson, S. J., et al. (2010). Transaction cost, opportunism and governance: contextual considerations and future research opportunities. Marketing Letters, 21, 211–222.
Robinson, S. (1968). New York State Bar Association, Antitrust Symposium, p. 29.
Simon, H. (1957). Models of man. New York: Wiley.
Simon, H. (1992). Economics, bounded rationality, and the cognitive revolution. Brookfield: Edward Elgar.
Tadelis, S. (2010). Williamson’s contribution and its relevance to 21st century capitalism. California Management Review, 52(2), 159–166.
Tadelis, S., & Williamson, O. (2011). Transaction-cost economics. In R. Gibbons and J. Roberts (Eds), The handbook of organizational economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Weiss, A., & Anderson, E. M. (1992). Perceptions of legitimacy as a motive to change inter-organizational relations. Stanford Graduate School of Business, Research Paper No. 1175, 1–24.
Whinston, M. (2001). Assessing property rights and transaction-cost theories of the firm. The American Economic Review, 91(2), 184–188.
Williamson, O. E. (1970). Administrative decision making and pricing. In J. Margolis (Ed.), The analysis of public output (pp. 115–135). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Williamson, O. E. (1971). The vertical integration of production: market failure considerations. The American Economic Review, 61(2), 112–123.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. New York: Free Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1976). Franchise bidding for natural monopolies—in general and with respect to CATV. Bell Journal of Economics, 7, 73–104.
Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction cost economics: the governance of contractual relations. Journal of Law and Economics, 22, 233–261.
Williamson, O. E. (1983). Credible commitments: using hostages to support exchange. The American Economic Review, 73, 519–540.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1988). Corporate finance and corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 43(July), 567–591.
Williamson, O. E. (1991). Comparative economic organization: the analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 269–296.
Williamson, O. E. (1993). Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization. Journal of Law and Economics, 36, 453–486.
Williamson, O. E. (1996a). The mechanisms of governance. Oxford University Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1996b). Transaction cost economics and the Carnegie connection. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 31, 149–155.
Williamson, O. E. (1999). Strategy research: governance and competence perspectives. Strategic Management Journal, 20, 1087–1108.
Williamson, O. E. (2000). The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking ahead. Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 595–613.
Williamson, O. E. (2003). Economics and antitrust enforcement: transition years. Antitrust, 17(Spring), 61–65.
Williamson, O. E. (2009). Pragmatic methodology: a sketch, with applications to transaction cost economics. Journal of Economic Methodology, 16, 145–157.
Williamson, O. E. (2010). Transaction cost economics: the natural progression. The American Economic Review, 100(3), 673–690.
Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience. New York: Knopf.