General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’?

Journal of Econometrics - Tập 65 - Trang 83-108 - 1995
Timothy F. Bresnahan1,2, M. Trajtenberg3,4
1Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA
2NBER, USA
3Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv, Israel
4NBER USA

Tài liệu tham khảo

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