The impacts of product market competition on the quantity and quality of voluntary disclosures

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 15 - Trang 663-711 - 2010
Xi Li1
1London Business School, London, UK

Tóm tắt

This study examines how firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions are influenced by product market competition. Using separate measures to capture different dimensions of competition, I show that competition from potential entrants increases disclosure quantity while competition from existing rivals decreases disclosure quantity. I also find that competition enhances disclosure quality mainly through reducing the optimism in profit forecasts and reducing the pessimism in investment forecasts. Moreover, I find that the above association is less pronounced for industry leaders, consistent with industry leaders facing less competitive pressures than industry followers.

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