Climate change control: the Lindahl solution
Tóm tắt
The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate different burden sharing rules with respect to abatement of carbon emissions. We evaluate seven different rules both in terms of their redistributive impact and by the extent to which they realize the aim of optimal abatement. We show that the Lindahl solution, where the burden sharing rule of carbon abatement is determined by each region’s willingness to pay, is to be preferred above the non-cooperative Nash outcome. Poor regions however would prefer the social planner outcome with a global permit market, because then the burden sharing rule has a secondary role of income redistribution by means of transfers from rich to poor, on top of its primary role of assigning abatement burdens. Based on these findings, we argue that in order to control global greenhouse gas emissions, the level of individual country emission abatement effort should be a function of their willingness to pay to curb climate change, rather than their historical emissions or ability to abate.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Bohm P, Larsen B (1994) Fairness in a tradeable-permit treaty for carbon emissions reductions in Europe and the former Soviet Union. Environ Resour Econ 4:219–239
Buchholz W, Peters W (2007) Justifying the Lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperation. Public Choice 133:157–169
Buchholz W, Peters W (2008) Equal sacrifice and fair burden-sharing in a public goods economy. Int Tax Public Financ 15:415–429
Buchholz W, Cornes R, Peters W (2006) Lindahl equilibrium versus voluntary contribution to a public good: the role of the income distribution. FinanzArchiv/Public Financ Anal 62(1):28–49
CAIT (2016) Climate analysis indicators tool, version 7.0. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC
Chichilnisky G, Heal G (1994) Who should abate carbon emissions: an international viewpoint. Econ Lett 44:443–449
Cramton P, Stoft S (2010) International climate games: from caps to cooperation, global energy policy center research paper, no.10-07. Downloaded from http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2010-2014/cramton-stoft-international-climate-games.pdf
Dellink R, den Elzen M, Aiking H, Bergsma E, Berkhout F, Dekker, T. And Gupta, J. (2009) Sharing the burden of financing adaptation to climate change. Glob Environ Chang:411–421
Edwards P, Miller C (eds) (2001) Changing the atmosphere: expert knowledge and global environmental governance. MIT Press, Cambridge
Elzen MGJ den, Lucas P (2003) FAIR 2.0—a decision-support tool to assess the environmental and economic consequences of future climate regimes, RIVM report 550015001, http://www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/550015001.html
Eyckmans J, Proost S, Schokkaert E (1993) Efficiency and distribution in greenhouse negotiations. Kyklos 46:363–397
Gardiner S (2004) Ethics and global climate change. Ethics 114:555–600
Giersch T (2007) From Lindahl’s garden to global warming: how useful is the Lindahl approach in the context of global public goods, paper 63rd congress of the IIPF, Warwick, UK. Downloaded from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/252365297_From_Lindahl%27s_Garden_to_Global_Warming_How_Useful_is_the_Lindahl_Approach_in_the_Context_of_Global_Public_Goods
Gupta J (1997) The climate change convention and developing countries: from conflict to consensus? Environment & Policy Series, vol 8. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht ISBN: 0-7923-4577-0
Heath J (2013) Climate policy: justifying a positive social time preference, http://www.academia.edu/3106885/Climate_Policy_Justifying_a_Positive_Social_Time_Preference
Hof AF, den Elzen MGJ, van Vuuren DP (2010) Including adaptation costs and climate change damages in evaluating post-2012 burden-sharing regimes. Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Chang 15(1):19–40
Mas-Colell A (1989) Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach. J Econ Theory 47:239–256
Milanovic B (2016) Global inequality: a new approach for the age of globalization. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge/London
Nordhaus WD (1991) The cost of slowing climate change: a survey. Energy J 12(1):37–64
Nordhaus WD (2007) A review of the “stern review on the economics of climate change”. J Econ Lit 45(3):686–702
Okada A (2007) International negotiations on climate change: a noncooperative game analysis of the Kyoto Protocol. In: Avenhaus R, Zartman IW (eds) Diplomacy games. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Sandler T, Murdoch JC (1990) Nash–Cournot or Lindahl behavior? An empirical test for the NATO allies. Q J Econ 105(4):875–894. doi:10.2307/2937877
Sandmo A (2003) Environmental taxation and revenue for development, WIDER Discussion Paper, no. 2003/86. Downloaded from https://www.cbd.int/financial/interdevinno/unu-dp2003-086.pdf
Sandmo A (2007) The Welfare economics of global public goods, lecture 63rd IIPF congress, University of Warwick. Downloaded from https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/163128/dp2007-35.pdf?sequence=1
Sheeran KA (2006) Who should abate carbon emissions? A Note. Environ Resour Econ 35:89–98
Shiell L (2003) Equity and efficiency in international markets for pollution permits. J Environ Econ Manag 46:38–51
Shitovits, Spiegel (1998) Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public good economies. J Econ Theory 83:1–18
Shitovits, Spiegel (2003) Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public “bad” economies. Economic Theory 22:17–31
Stern N (2006) The economics of climate change. The stern review. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Stern N (2007) Stern review on the economics of climate change. Executive Summary, HM Treasury, London, online at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview_index.htm
Tol RSJ (2002) Estimates of the damage costs of climate change. Part II. Dynamic estimates. Environ Resour Econ 21:135–160
Voigt C (2008) State responsibility for climate change damages. Nord J Int Law 77:1–22
Weitzman ML (2001) Gamma discounting. Am Econ Rev 91(1):260–271