Choosing Among Regulatory Options in the United States Telecommunications Industry
Tóm tắt
We examine the determinants of the choice between rate-of-return regulation and incentive regulation in the United States telecommunications industry. We find that a state is more likely to select incentive regulation in any year: (1) when it has employed incentive regulation in the past; (2) when the Republican party controls both the executive and the legislative branches of the state government, but the Democratic party has controlled these branches historically; and (3) as the firm‘s earnings under rate-of-return regulation increase toward the industry average. We also find that appointed regulators are more likely than their elected counterparts to revert to rate-of-return regulation.
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