Cheap Talk

Journal of Economic Perspectives - Tập 10 Số 3 - Trang 103-118 - 1996
Joseph Farrell1, Matthew Rabin2
1Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, California; Chief Economist, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C..
2Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, California.

Tóm tắt

Economists often ask how private information is shared through markets, costly signaling, and other mechanisms. Yet most information sharing is done through ordinary, informal talk. Economists are inconsistent in their view of such ‘cheap talk’: sometimes it is supposed that communication generally leads to efficient equilibria; other times it is supposed that since ‘talk is cheap,’ it is never credible. The authors think both views are wrong. In this paper, they describe what some recent research in game theory teaches about when people will convey private information by cheap talk.

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

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Thông tin
Thông tin xuất bản

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Tập 10 Số 3

103-118

Thông tin tác giả