Social Insurance, Labor Contracts, and Education-Job Mismatch among Graduates in Teacher Education and Educational Science in Vietnam

This paper examines the impact of social insurance, labor contracts and education-job on wages among graduates in the fields of teacher education and educational science in Vietnam. It uses data from the Labour Force Survey conducted between 2018 and 2020. Regression analysis reveals that, among graduates in matched jobs, those with social insurance earn higher average wages than those without. Similarly, graduates with permanent labor contracts earn higher average wages than those without. However, among those with social insurance or permanent labor contracts, graduates in mismatched jobs earn higher average wages than those in matched jobs. These findings suggest that having social insurance and permanent labor contracts is key to securing higher wages for graduates. Additionally, the wage premium associated with job mismatch suggests that graduates may self-select into mismatched jobs offering higher pay, due in part to the relatively low wages in Vietnam’s education sector.