The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory
1573-6954
0926-4957
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Các bài báo tiêu biểu
Adverse Selection When Loss Severities Differ: First-Best and Costly Equilibria
Tập 18 - Trang 173-182 - 1993
With information asymmetry between contracting parties, adverse selection may
result. A separation may be achieved if low-risk types can signal their
identity—for example, by selecting from a menu of price-quantity contracts. In
such models, signaling is costly and solutions are, at best, second best. These
models characterize risk types by differences in the probability, rather than in
severity, ...
Non-Informative Rational Expectations Equilibria When Assets are Nominal: An Example
Tập 15 - Trang 73-79 - 1990
When assets are nominal, non-informative rational expectations equilibria exist.
Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market: Introducing Taxes
Tập 19 - Trang 101-117 - 1994
We introduce profit taxation in Borch's [1962] model of a competitive insurance
market. We analyze the impact of taxation on equilibrium prices and characterize
the cases where optimal risk sharing is preserved. In the case of Constant
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions, this abstract characterization
is translated into simple conditions involving the solvency ratios of the
companies....
Coalition-Proof Allocations in Adverse-Selection Economies
Tập 24 - Trang 5-17 - 1999
We reexamine the canonical adverse selection insurance economy first studied by
Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976]. We define blocking in a way that takes private
information into account and define a coalition-proof correspondence as a
mapping from coalitions to allocations with the property that allocations are in
the correspondence, if and only if, they are not blocked by any other
allocations in t...
The Design of Optimal Insurance Contracts: A Topological Approach
Tập 22 - Trang 5-19 - 1997
This article deals with the optimal design of insurance contracts when the
insurer faces administrative costs. If the literature provides many analyses of
risk sharing with such costs, it is often assumed that these costs are linear.
Furthermore, mathematical tools or initial conditions differ from one paper to
another. We propose here a unified framework in which the problem is presented
and solv...
Voluntary Contributions with Uncertainty: The Environmental Quality
Tập 23 - Trang 151-165 - 1998
This article presents a model in which production causes pollution that
diminishes the welfare of its agents. Each agent is concerned with the quality
of its environment and may voluntary contribute to improve it by financing
depollution technology. The effectiveness of this technology on the quality of
the environment is uncertain. We show that if an agent is sufficiently risk
averse, voluntary c...