Eric Briys, Harris Schlesinger, J.-Matthias Graf v. d. Schulenburg
This paper examines the three main tools of risk management in a setting where reliability cannot be guaranteed. Thus, for example, insurers might be insolvent, sprinkler systems might be inoperative and alarm systems might be faulty. These types of nonreliability are shown to have significant consequences for risk management. In particular, the relationships between increased risk aversion and th...... hiện toàn bộ
We extend the familiar income taxation model à la Mirrlees, so as to include income uncertainty, due for instance to a risk of illness. Following a line of research initiated by Blomqvist and Horn [1984] we prove that the existence of a Social Health Insurance system may be justified even when the insurance market is efficient. Moreover, if there is a negative statistical dependence between probab...... hiện toàn bộ
It is shown that the effect of increased probability of loss on the demand for insurance depends on whether both insured and insurer are aware of the change. When both insurer and insured share the same beliefs about the probability of loss (symmetric information), an increase in the loss probability may lead risk-averse agents to demand less insurance.
Communication and no-communication versions of a two-stage principal-agent model are compared. The models contain a risk-averse agent and two sources of private information, a shock to preferences followed by a productive action. Both models are formulated as linear programs, which are then used to compute solutions to examples. For the communication model, an alternative method of accounting for ...... hiện toàn bộ
The paper examines property insurance contracts in which consumers choose the upper limit on coverage. Exclusions are of two types, and both reduce the demand for insurance of the included perils. A practical implication is that an insurer can raise the demand for fire insurance by offering an earthquake rider, and profit from the rider even when the premia are ceded in such a way that the rider d...... hiện toàn bộ
There is no consensus among health economists about the specification of individual preferences that best fits observed behaviors. One crucial point of disagreement concerns the sign of the interaction between health and wealth in individual utility functions. We propose here a simple, static, model where individuals have only one decision to make concerning their future health (say to get a flu s...... hiện toàn bộ