Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutionsSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 23 - Trang 53-73 - 2019
Emin Karagözoğlu, Kerim Keskin, Elif Özcan-Tok
We study the salience and power of reference points in determining the effective
anchors and aspirations in bargaining problems. Along this line, we enrich the
analysis of the standard bargaining model with two new parameters: the first
parameter can be interpreted as the effectiveness (or salience) of the reference
point in determining the anchor, whereas the second parameter can be interpreted
a... hiện toàn bộ
New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy ruleSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 10 - Trang 73-84 - 2006
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Antonio Villar
Concede-and-divide is a well-known and widely accepted procedure to solve
bankruptcy situations involving two agents. In a recent paper, Moreno-Ternero
and Villar (2004) characterize it by means of a new property, called securement,
that imposes a lower bound on the awards agents might obtain. This property can
be naturally decomposed in two more elementary ones. We show that each of these
compone... hiện toàn bộ
Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade spaceSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 9 - Trang 271-287 - 2005
Guillaume Bernis, Gaël Giraud
This paper deals with the problem of implementing the Walras correspondence via
Nash equilibria, in exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and
finitely many households with possibly non-ordered preferences. We explicitly
construct a feasible mechanism enjoying some features, which have natural
economic meanings. Under a fairly weak boundary condition, this game fully
implements the Wa... hiện toàn bộ
Lender learning and entry under general demand uncertaintySpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 15 - Trang 163-175 - 2011
Neelam Jain, Leonard J. Mirman
In this paper, we examine the effect of potential entry on learning by a lender
when the demand shock has a general distribution. We show that under this type
of noise, entry does not lead to any changes in the equilibrium expected signals
and therefore, there is no effect on learning by the lender, unlike the case
when noise is uniformly distributed. The result holds even when contracts are
not o... hiện toàn bộ
Probabilities of election outcomes with two parameters: The relative impact of unifying and polarizing candidatesSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 9 - Trang 317-336 - 2005
William V. Gehrlein
Consider an election on three candidates for n voters with complete and
transitive preference rankings on the candidates. Let k (r) denote the minimum
total number of last (middle) position rankings for each of the three
candidates. If k is close to zero, some candidate is seldom disliked and is a
unifying candidate. If r is close to zero, some candidate is always either liked
or disliked and is a... hiện toàn bộ
Implementation of social optimum in oligopolySpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 1 - Trang 319-326 - 1994
Mark Gradstein
This paper presents a decentralized mechanism implementing socially optimal
output choices by non-cooperatively acting oligopolists. A decentralized
mechanism is a vector of balanced transfers among firms determined as a function
of firms’ output choices. The mechanism is devised by a regulator with a full
knowledge of demand and without any knowledge of the firms’ cost functions.
Restricting the ... hiện toàn bộ
In search of efficient network structures: the needle in the haystackSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 11 - Trang 339-359 - 2007
Nicolas Carayol, Pascale Roux, Murat Yıldızoğlu
Searching for efficient networks can prove a very difficult analytical and even
computational task. In this paper, we explore the possibility of using the
genetic algorithms (GA) technique to identify efficient network structures in
the case of non-trivial payoff functions. The robustness of this method in
predicting optimal networks is tested on the two simple stylized models
introduced by Jackso... hiện toàn bộ