Do control rights determine the optimal extension of liability to investors? The case of environmental policy for minesSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 48 - Trang 26-52 - 2015
Ben White
Using a Pigovian tax to provide incentives for mine rehabilitation may be ineffective if limited liability, (judgement-proof) firms can declare themselves bankrupt to avoid the tax and rehabilitation costs. This paper introduces a model of environmental policy for mining that accounts for bankruptcy risk, profit risk, and a mobilization cost that applies if, following bankruptcy, rehabilitation is...... hiện toàn bộ
Regulatory compliance with nonlinear penaltiesSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 2 - Trang 99-103 - 1990
Sherrill Shaffer
Previous work has shown that, when firms choose only partial compliance with a regulatory standard, tightening the standard may drive firms' behavior in the wrong direction. This note explores the potential of nonlinear penalty functions to move behavior in the socially desired direction when standards are tightened without raising the total penalty.
Optimal Allocation of Tradable Pollution Rights and Market StructuresSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 28 - Trang 205-223 - 2005
Dafna M. Disegni Eshel
Tradable environmental rights are increasingly pursed as a regulatory instrument, to control for environmental quality. However, in the presence of market power, regulation through an allocation of tradable rights generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article analyzes the effect of the initial distribution of tradable rights on the firms’ strategies and performance in abatement and production...... hiện toàn bộ
Choosing Among Regulatory Options in the United States Telecommunications IndustrySpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 12 - Trang 227-243 - 1997
Stephen G. Donald, David E. M. Sappington
We examine the determinants of the choice between rate-of-return regulation and incentive regulation in the United States telecommunications industry. We find that a state is more likely to select incentive regulation in any year: (1) when it has employed incentive regulation in the past; (2) when the Republican party controls both the executive and the legislative branches of the state government...... hiện toàn bộ
Incentive regulation, service quality, and standards in U.S. electricity distributionSpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 38 - Trang 258-273 - 2010
Anna Ter-Martirosyan, John Kwoka
The widespread use of incentive regulation in telecom, electricity, and other industries in the U.S. and elsewhere has raised questions about its possible adverse effect on the quality of service. This paper examines U.S. electricity distribution utilities in the years 1993–1999, several of which were subject to incentive regulation. Controlling for other possible influences, including possible en...... hiện toàn bộ
Information regulation: Do the victims of externalities pay attention?Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 30 - Trang 141-158 - 2006
Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Miki Mitsunari
Individuals living in metropolitan areas are exposed to a large number of industrial risks. Information regulation is a new tool to manage such risks. We ask if large-scale information initiatives directed at the general public can affect individual risk perceptions. The answer is affirmative. Using the publication of the Toxics Release Inventory as a case study, we find a decline in predicted pro...... hiện toàn bộ
On the sufficiency of regulatory enforcement in combating piracySpringer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 40 - Trang 160-176 - 2011
Dyuti S. Banerjee
The literature on piracy has questioned the role of regulatory enforcement in the form of monitoring in deterring piracy. This article shows that for a wide range of penalty levels the equilibrium monitoring rate is such that it is optimal for the copyright holder to prevent piracy by expanding his output beyond the monopoly output level rather than producing the monopoly output level and investin...... hiện toàn bộ