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This article is concerned with the possible role of reference points and loss aversion (as suggested by prospect theory) in subjects' judgments about the value of increments and decrements in automobile safety. The contingent valuation method is employed in two experiments, both of which consider subjects' willingness-to-pay (WTP) for increased safety and compensation demanded (CD) for decreased safety in hypothetical new vehicle purchases. The results establish that disparities exist in subjects' WTP and CD values for the same increment of auto safety, even for a close-to-market context such as hypothetical new vehicle purchases. The results also indicate that evaluations can be manipulated by changing the perception of the reference point: losses can be recast as forgone gains and forgone gains as losses, altering (or even eliminating) differences between WTP and CD values.

As economics modeling moves from super rational decision makers to considering boundedly rational agents, some economic problems deserve a second look. This paper studies the effects of learning on the efficiency of search. Once learning is taken into account, the structure of information flow becomes important. In particular, I highlight the truncated information structure in the search problem. Agents stop searching once a sufficiently attractive price is found. Therefore, they observe the performance of shorter searches, but do not directly observe the performance of longer searches. I design and conduct an experiment to test the hypothesis that this asymmetric flow of information leads agents to search too little. I find strong evidence in its favor. This suggests that in the presence of learning, the provision of a more symmetric information structure will make search more efficient.

Health-Health analysis has attracted considerable attention as one way to evaluate the costs of regulatory policy to people. When a regulation is adopted to reduce the “risk” experienced by a particular group, health-health analysis seeks to evaluate when the indirect effects of an increase in prices or reduction in income offsets the direct effects intended by the regulation. If these indirect effects are large enough, then the general population can experience an increase in their overall risk. The article considers health-health analysis as it relates to policy decisions from conceptual and empirical perspectives. A comparative static analysis was a simple model is used to illustrate the factors influencing the relative effects of income and policy variables on risk. The empirical analysis also suggests that results with aggregate cross-country data and simple reduced-form models for the relationship of mortality to income are sensitive to model specifications and the sample composition.

Our survey results demonstrate that targeted screening of airline passengers raises conflicting concerns of efficiency and equity. Support for profiling increases if there is a substantial reduction in avoided delays to other passengers. The time cost and benefit components of targeting affect support for targeted screening in an efficiency-oriented manner. Nonwhite respondents are more reluctant than whites to support targeting or to be targeted. Terrorism risk assessments are highly diffuse, reflecting considerable risk ambiguity. People fear highly severe worst case terrorism outcomes, but their best estimates of the risk are more closely related to their lower bound estimates than their upper bound estimates. Anomalies evident in other risk perception contexts, such as hindsight biases and embeddedness effects, are particularly evident for terrorism risk beliefs.

It has been a longstanding goal of the behavioral sciences to measure and model people’s risk preferences. In this article, we adopt a novel theoretical perspective of doing so and test to what extent specific types of individuals share similar risk profiles (i.e., configurations of multidimensional risk preferences). To this end, we analyzed data of a U.S. sample (N = 3,123) in a comprehensive and rigorous way, resulting in a twofold contribution. First, based on data from the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale (DOSPERT) and using a cross-validation procedure, we established a multidimensional trait space including general and domain-specific dimensions of risk preference. Second, we employed model-based cluster analyses in this multidimensional trait space, finding that 66% of participants can be described well with four basic risk profiles. In sum, the typological perspective proposed in this article has important implications for current theories of risk preference and the measurement of individual differences therein.

Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We consider two dimensions: the timing at which the uncertainty about whether one will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination thereof. By varying these dimensions of delay systematically, we find a surprising non-monotonic relation with deterrence: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as possible delayed) emerge as most effective at deterring deviant behavior and recidivism. Our results yield implications for the design of institutional policies aimed at mitigating misconduct and reducing recidivism.

This study compares discounting for money and health in a field study. We applied the direct method, which measures discounting independent of utility, in a representative French sample, interviewed at home by professional interviewers. We found more discounting for money than for health. The median discount rates (6.5% for money and 2.2% for health) were close to market interest rates, suggesting that at the aggregate level the direct method solves the puzzle of unrealistically high discount rates typically observed in applied economics. Constant discounting fitted the data better than the hyperbolic discounting models that we considered. The substantial individual heterogeneity in discounting was correlated with age and occupation.

It is widely accepted that individuals tend to underinsure against low-probability, high-loss events relative to high-probability, low-loss events. This conventional wisdom is based largely on field studies, as there is very little experimental evidence. We reexamine this issue with an experiment that accounts for possible confounds in prior insurance experiments. Our results are counter to the prior experimental evidence, as we observe subjects buying more insurance for lower-probability events than for higher-probability events, given a constant expected loss and load factor. Insofar as underinsurance for catastrophic risk is observed in the field, our results suggest that this can be attributed to factors other than only the relative probability of the loss events.

We implement a risk experiment that allows for judgment errors to investigate who makes mistakes and whether it matters. The experiments are conducted with a random sample of the adult population in Rwanda, and data on financial decisions are collected. We find a high proportion of inconsistent choices, with over 50% of the participants making at least one mistake. Importantly, errors are informative. While risk aversion alone does not explain financial decisions, risk aversion and inconsistent choices interact in significant and sensible ways. As we would expect, risk-averse individuals are more likely to belong to a savings group and less likely to take out an informal loan. For those more likely to make mistakes, however, as they become more risk averse, they are less likely to belong to a savings group and more likely to take up informal credit, suggesting that mistakes correlate with less than optimal behavior.

Do people know their own risk preferences, or do risk choices change with experience and observation? We provide a straightforward test in the laboratory. People make an initial decision concerning a lottery choice and then experience 24 unpaid practice periods in which they roll the dice, record the outcome, and record the would-be payoff. They then make a final decision for the lottery choice; one of the first and last periods is randomly chosen for payment. Our primary hypothesis is that people will become less risk-averse by having made and experienced the practice rolls. We do find that people are significantly more likely to become less risk-averse than more risk-averse over time. We note that this move towards assuming increased risk goes in the opposite direction from what is at least arguably predicted by loss aversion and reference dependence. We find that women’s preferences change much less during a session than men’s preferences change. We feel that our literally hands-on approach ensures a degree of engagement that helps to accelerate the learning process. We argue that measures obtained after people have had experience with a mechanism are more meaningful, and that this principle might well extend more generally to other elicitation tasks.