Springer Science and Business Media LLC

This paper presents the empirical and theoretical evidence in support of the factor-gene model of emotionality. The theory views the expression of emotion as a product of the interaction between cognition and affect, where cognition and affect are each defined as complex systems whose wholistic functioning (cognition interprets inputs and affect controls arousal level) follows the principles of systems and information-processing theory and whose components are identified via factor analysis. On the basis of the empirical identification of factors at the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd strata, it has been hypothesized that the factors in each domain (33 cognitive factors and 31 affective factors) are hierarchically organized. The empirical research also indicates a significant hereditary effect for 31% of the factors in the cognitive domain and for 83% of the factors in the affective domain. The most pervasive experimental finding concerning the mode of inheritance is that each factor is polygenically determined. Furthermore, in the affective domain there is a range of dominance effects, depending on the class of factors. That is, factors related to escape and avoidance are governed by complete or overdominance, and some of them (e.g., escape) also manifest directional dominance, whereas factors related to undifferentiated arousal (e.g., autonomic balance) manifest either partial dominance or an intermediate form of inheritance. In brief, the factor-gene model is a multiple factor model at both the behavioral (i.e., the factors identified by factor analysis) and genetic (i.e., many genes accounting for each behavioral factor) levels. Futhermore, factors and genes are linked via a variety of unspecified, intervening (and to date unknown) psychobiological mechanisms.

People experience autonomy when they perceive their behaviour to be volitional rather than driven by external controls. Previous research has studied autonomy in relationships at a general level, focusing on people’s motivations to maintain their romantic relationships, as measured by the Couple Motivation Questionnaire (CMQ; Blais et al., J Personal Soc Psychol 59:1021–1031, 1990). To supplement the CMQ, we developed the Motivations for Relational Activities (MRA) scale, which assesses the extent to which people feel autonomous and controlled in a variety of specific relational activities. The purpose of this study is to examine the unique contributions of general motivations to maintain a relationship (CMQ) and motivations toward specific relational activities (MRA) in the prediction of relationship well-being. Results showed that the MRA and CMQ both independently and significantly contributed to the prediction of relationship well-being (i.e., commitment, intimacy, satisfaction, and vitality within the relationship) and were differentiated by their associations to dimensions of personality and attachment.

Based on evidence linking social anxiety with social skills deficits, it was hypothesized that socially anxious individuals would exhibit diminished social skills in a naturalistic interaction, relative to socially nonanxious persons, and that they would also elicit rejection from their conversational partners and experience loneliness. Socially anxious and nonanxious persons were surreptitiously videotaped while they waited with partners for an experiment to begin. Analyses of subjects' social skills indicated that, behaviorally, the socially anxious appear very similar to their nonanxious peers. At the same time, however, they exhibited a tendency to negatively misperceive their own social skills. Although socially anxious persons did not elicit significantly more rejection from their conversational partners, they did report being more lonely than nonanxious persons. Socially anxious subjects were also rated by their conversational partners as lower in social skill than were nonanxious subjects. Implications for further study of social skills among the socially anxious are discussed.

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the degree to which persons distinguish between what are termed “attitudinal” and “distant consequence” expectancies, the conditions under which consequential expectancies predict behavior, and the effects of conflicting attitudinal and consequential expectancies. Attitudinal expectancies are beliefs about the immediate hedonic outcomes of behaving; consequential expectancies are beliefs about distant, nonsocially mediated behavioral outcomes. A simulation experiment was conducted in which, in a 3×3 design, subjects either were or were not given attitudinal and consequential information about hypothetical behaviors that either favored or did not favor performing the behaviors. A second experiment extended the first by using a real rather than a hypothetical decision dilemma and by manipulating attitudinal (and social support) versus consequential expectancies in a 2×3 design. The results of the two studies were nearly identical in supporting the attitude-distant consequence distinction and in demonstrating that consequential considerations are an important antecedent of behavioral decisions. The implications of these findings and of the expectancy theory/decision-making approach to the development of a broad theory of action are discussed.

Three studies examined the effects of motivation attributed to helpers on recipient reactions. Participants read and responded to scenarios depicting various helping events, in which indicators of helpers having autonomous or controlled (introjected) motivations were embedded. Results showed that recipients experienced more gratitude toward autonomous helpers than those helping for controlled motivations. Helping interactions involving more autonomous attributions were also predictive of positive attitudes toward helpers, positive affect, and felt closeness. Gratitude mediated the effects of autonomous versus controlled helping on recipient positive attitude, well-being, and closeness to helpers. Study 3 confirmed that helper autonomous motivation independently predicted gratitude and other positive reactions to receiving help even when controlling for other important attributions, namely, perceived helper empathy, cost to helper, valuing of help, and perceived similarity.

Drawing upon terror management theory, the present study aimed to examine how mortality salience influences youth materialism as well as to explore the mediating role of future orientation and the moderating role of awe in the focal relationship. Three sub-studies (N = 2568) were conducted to test our theoretically driven hypotheses. In a large representative Chinese sample (Study 1), a set of questionnaires were used to provide preliminary evidence for our moderated mediation model. A positive association was found between mortality salience and youth materialism via future orientation; this association was much weaker for youths higher in trait awe. In follow-up studies, two priming experiments were performed to further improve the robustness of our hypothesized model. Youths in the mortality salience condition reported lower future orientation and higher materialism than those in the control condition. Inductions of mortality salience increased materialism by decreasing future orientation and that this mediation was conditioned on the level of trait awe (Study 2) and priming awe (Study 3). The findings not only illuminate the role of future orientation in explaining why mortality salience makes youths more materialistic but also highlight the role of awe in buffering the link between mortality salience and youth materialism. Thus, this work offers a significant contribution to prevention and intervention programs that aim to protect youths from the negative impact of death-related information and to promote their positive development.

Using structural equation modeling (SEM), this study examines how adolescents’ rated importance (talk) and enactment (walk) of extrinsic values (wealth, beauty, and fame) and intrinsic values (affiliation, self-acceptance, and community) relate to their well-being and risk-taking. An online questionnaire was filled out by 647 adolescents (57.1% girls), aged between 14 and 17 years old (Mage = 15.5 years). Talk intrinsic values were positively associated with well-being, whereas talk extrinsic values were non-significantly related to it. As for the walk measures, we found an interaction between extrinsic and intrinsic values in the prediction of well-being. Extrinsic values enactment and well-being were positively related among adolescents reporting lower intrinsic values enactment, but not among adolescents who reported higher intrinsic values enactment. Finally, using either talk or walk measures, only extrinsic values were associated with higher risk-taking behaviors.

This study examined curiosity as a mechanism for achieving and maintaining high levels of well-being and meaning in life. Of primary interest was whether people high in trait curiosity derive greater well-being on days when they are more curious. We also tested whether trait and daily curiosity led to greater, sustainable well-being. Predictions were tested using trait measures and 21 daily diary reports from 97 college students. We found that on days when they are more curious, people high in trait curiosity reported more frequent growth-oriented behaviors, and greater presence of meaning, search for meaning, and life satisfaction. Greater trait curiosity and greater curiosity on a given day also predicted greater persistence of meaning in life from one day into the next. People with greater trait curiosity reported more frequent hedonistic events but they were associated with less pleasure compared to the experiences of people with less trait curiosity. The benefits of hedonistic events did not last beyond the day of their occurrence. As evidence of construct specificity, curiosity effects were not attributable to Big Five personality traits or daily positive or negative mood. Our results provide support for curiosity as an ingredient in the development of well-being and meaning in life. The pattern of findings casts doubt on some distinctions drawn between eudaimonia and hedonic well-being traditions.