Review of Economic Studies

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Sắp xếp:  
Market Share, Market Value and Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms
Review of Economic Studies - Tập 66 Số 3 - Trang 529-554 - 1999
Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith, John Van Reenen
Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy
Review of Economic Studies - Tập 68 Số 1 - Trang 67-82 - 2001
Tim Besley, Stephen Coate
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium
Review of Economic Studies - Tập 54 Số 4 - Trang 681 - 1987
Charles D. Kolstad, Lars Mathiesen
Using Gossips to Spread Information: Theory and Evidence from Two Randomized Controlled Trials
Review of Economic Studies - Tập 86 Số 6 - Trang 2453-2490 - 2019
Abhijit Banerjee, Arun G. Chandrasekhar, Esther Duflo, Matthew O. Jackson
Abstract

Can we identify highly central individuals in a network without collecting network data, simply by asking community members? Can seeding information via such nominated individuals lead to significantly wider diffusion than via randomly chosen people, or even respected ones? In two separate large field experiments in India, we answer both questions in the affirmative. In particular, in 521 villages in Haryana, we provided information on monthly immunization camps to either randomly selected individuals (in some villages) or to individuals nominated by villagers as people who would be good at transmitting information (in other villages). We find that the number of children vaccinated every month is 22% higher in villages in which nominees received the information. We show that people’s knowledge of who are highly central individuals and good seeds can be explained by a model in which community members simply track how often they hear gossip about others. Indeed, we find in a third data set that nominated seeds are central in a network sense, and are not just those with many friends or in powerful positions.

Estimation and Forecasting in Models with Multiple Breaks
Review of Economic Studies - Tập 74 Số 3 - Trang 763-789 - 2007
Gary Koop, Simon Potter
Forecasting Time Series Subject to Multiple Structural Breaks
Review of Economic Studies - Tập 73 Số 4 - Trang 1057-1084 - 2006
M. Hashem Pesaran, Davide Pettenuzzo, Allan Timmermann
Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition
Review of Economic Studies - Tập 56 Số 3 - Trang 317 - 1989
Albert S. Kyle
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Review of Economic Studies - Tập 66 Số 1 - Trang 169-182 - 1999
Bengt Holmström
Econometric Evaluation of Linear Macro-Economic Models
Review of Economic Studies - Tập 53 Số 4 - Trang 671 - 1986
Yock Y. Chong, David F. Hendry
Uncertainty and Investment Dynamics
Review of Economic Studies - Tập 74 Số 2 - Trang 391-415 - 2007
Nick Bloom, Stephen Bond, John Van Reenen
Tổng số: 141   
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