Journal of Regional Science

ABSTRACT We examine the inter‐regional migration of university graduates from 1991 to 2003 in Finland. The results show that time matters: two‐years before and during the graduation year the hazard rates of migration increase, and then decrease thereafter. Although university graduates are particularly mobile, we find that most of them do not move from their region of studies within 10 years after graduation. The out‐migration, i.e., brain drain, is much higher among graduates in the more peripheral universities than in the growth centers (Helsinki in particular). Migration is also substantially more likely for those studying away from the home region than for those studying at home.

In this paper we address two aspects of regulatory federalism in U.S. environmental policy. First, we suggest that environmental quality in U.S. states responds positively to increases in income. Second, we provide evidence that environmental quality did not decline when President Reagan's policy of new federalism returned responsibility for many environmental regulations to the states. Thus, state environmental quality appears to reflect more than just the dictates of federal policy. Additionally, we find that a “race to the bottom” in environmental quality did not materialize in the 1980s.

Abstract Many theoretical models analyze the effects of decentralized environmental policymaking. The predictions range from a race to the top, a race to the bottom, or no effect. However, little empirical evidence exists to resolve this ambiguity. This paper fills the void by examining the impact of decentralized environmental policymaking in the U.S. under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. For abatement expenditures, Reagan's decentralization had no discernible impact before the mid‐1980s, but by the mid‐1980s the data are consistent with decentralization leading to a race to the top. No statistically significant effect is found on nitrogen oxide or sulfur dioxide emissions.

ABSTRACT This paper links the two nascent economic literatures on social networks and cultural assimilation by investigating the evolution of population attributes in a simple model where agents are influenced by their acquaintances. The main conclusion of the analysis is that attributes converge to a melting‐pot equilibrium, where everyone is identical, provided the social network exhibits a sufficient degree of interconnectedness. When the model is extended to allow an expanding acquaintance set, convergence is guaranteed provided a weaker interconnectedness condition is satisfied, and convergence is rapid. If the intensity of interactions with acquaintances becomes endogenous, convergence (when it occurs) is slowed when agents prefer to interact with people like themselves and hastened when interaction with dissimilar agents is preferred.

ABSTRACT Analysis of social interactions has recently become an important area of economic research, and the focus of researchers in this area has increasingly shifted toward dynamic models. In one recent contribution, Brueckner and Smirnov (2007) analyze the evolution of population attributes in an exceedingly simple model, where an agent's attributes at time t are equal to the average attribute value among his acquaintances. The pattern of acquaintances in the population is determined by the social network, and Brueckner and Smirnov (BS) explore the effect of network characteristics on the convergence of population attributes over time. They show that some simple sufficient conditions on the network structure ensure convergence to a “melting‐pot” equilibrium where attributes are uniform across agents. The present paper provides a generalization of BS's analysis, allowing for a more general form of the rule governing the evolution of population attributes. The analysis shows that BS's previous conclusions continue to hold under this generalization, while also providing a result that can be applied more generally to other models.

ABSTRACT. This paper studies the price‐location equilibrium of duopolists supplying differentiated goods and competing in a spatial market with elastic demand. We show that a price‐location equilibrium exists under all three pricing policies traditionally considered by the literature: f.o.b. mill, uniform delivered, and spatially discriminatory pricing. We also show that firms always cluster at the market center. The second part of the paper studies the endogenous choice of pricing policy. A surprising feature of the resulting equilibrium is asymmetry. The greater the extent to which the goods are substitutes, the more likely is it that one firm will choose f.o.b. pricing and the other price discrimination. Finally, the welfare consequences of the analysis show some interesting trade‐offs.

Transport infrastructure investment is a cornerstone of growth‐promoting strategies. However, the link between infrastructure investment and economic performance remains unclear. This may be a consequence of overlooking the role of government institutions. This paper assesses the connection between regional quality of government and the returns of different types of road infrastructure in the regions of the European Union. The results unveil the influence of regional quality of government on the economic returns of transport infrastructure. In weak institutional contexts, investment in motorways—the preferred option by governments—yields significantly lower returns than the more humble secondary road. Government institutions also affect the returns of transport maintenance investment.