From the lab to the field: envelopes, dictators and mannersExperimental Economics - Tập 17 - Trang 304-313 - 2013
Jan Stoop
This paper reports results of a natural field experiment on the dictator game
where subjects are unaware that they are participating in an experiment. Three
other experiments explore, step by step, how laboratory behavior of students
relates to field behavior of a general population. In all experiments, subjects
display an equally high amount of pro-social behavior, whether they are students
or no... hiện toàn bộ
Circadian effects on strategic reasoningExperimental Economics - Tập 15 - Trang 444-459 - 2011
David L. Dickinson, Todd McElroy
The ability to strategically reason is important in many competitive
environments. In this paper, we examine how relatively mild temporal variations
in cognition affect reasoning in the Beauty Contest. The source of temporal
cognition variation that we explore is the time-of-day that decisions are made.
Our first result is that circadian mismatched subjects (i.e., those making
decisions at off-pea... hiện toàn bộ
Conducting interactive experiments onlineExperimental Economics - Tập 21 - Trang 99-131 - 2017
Antonio A. Arechar, Simon Gächter, Lucas Molleman
Online labor markets provide new opportunities for behavioral research, but
conducting economic experiments online raises important methodological
challenges. This particularly holds for interactive designs. In this paper, we
provide a methodological discussion of the similarities and differences between
interactive experiments conducted in the laboratory and online. To this end, we
conduct a repe... hiện toàn bộ
Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: An experimental studyExperimental Economics - Tập 10 - Trang 391-409 - 2007
Anders U. Poulsen, Jonathan H. W. Tan
We experimentally investigate if free information disadvantages a player
relative to when information is unavailable. We study an Ultimatum game where
the Proposer, before making an offer, can obtain free information about the
Responder's minimum acceptable offer. Theoretically, the Proposer should obtain
the information and play a best reply to the Responder's minimum acceptable
offer. Thus the R... hiện toàn bộ
Framing the first-price auctionExperimental Economics - Tập 10 - Trang 37-51 - 2007
Theodore L. Turocy, Elizabeth Watson, Raymond C. Battalio
We revisit the result that, in laboratory independent private values auction,
the first-price sealed bid and descending clock (or Dutch) implementations are
not isomorphic. We investigate the hypothesis that this arises from framing and
presentation effects. Our design focuses on a careful construction of subject
interfaces that present the two environments as similarly as possible. Our
sessions a... hiện toàn bộ
Defaults and effortful tasksExperimental Economics - - 2023
Lars Behlen, Oliver Himmler, Robert Jäckle
AbstractNothing is known about the effectiveness of defaults when moving the
target outcomes requires substantial effort. We conduct two field experiments to
investigate how defaults fare in such situations: we change the university exam
sign-up procedure in two study programs to “opt-out” (a) for a single exam, and
(b) for many exams. Both interventions increase task uptake (exam sign-up).
Concer... hiện toàn bộ
Why We Should Not Be Silent About NoiseExperimental Economics - Tập 8 - Trang 325-345 - 2005
John D. Hey
There is an odd contradiction about much of the empirical (experimental)
literature: The data is analysed using statistical tools which presuppose that
there is some noise or randomness in the data, but the source and possible
nature of the noise are rarely explicitly discussed. This paper argues that the
noise should be brought out into the open, and its nature and implications
openly discussed. ... hiện toàn bộ
Dissertation abstract: Contestability and the significance of the entrant’s home marketExperimental Economics - Tập 10 - Trang 193-194 - 2007
Utteeyo Dasgupta
The traditional description of Contestability theory considers the importance of
potential entry threats in disciplining the incumbent firm in a natural monopoly
market. Such a description however overlooks an important element in strategic
interaction, that of an entrant firm having its own home market. Adding a home
market to the model can critically alter conclusions and equilibrium predictions... hiện toàn bộ