Circadian effects on strategic reasoningExperimental Economics - Tập 15 - Trang 444-459 - 2011
David L. Dickinson, Todd McElroy
The ability to strategically reason is important in many competitive environments. In this paper, we examine how relatively mild temporal variations in cognition affect reasoning in the Beauty Contest. The source of temporal cognition variation that we explore is the time-of-day that decisions are made. Our first result is that circadian mismatched subjects (i.e., those making decisions at off-pea...... hiện toàn bộ
What drives conditional cooperation in public good games?Experimental Economics - Tập 26 - Trang 435-467 - 2022
Peter Katuščák, Tomáš Miklánek
Extensive experimental research on public good games documents that many subjects are “conditional cooperators” in that they positively correlate their contribution with (their belief about) contributions of other subjects in their peer group. The goal of our study is to shed light on what preference and decision-making patterns drive this observed regularity. We consider reciprocity, conformity, ...... hiện toàn bộ
Measuring higher order ambiguity preferencesExperimental Economics - Tập 21 - Trang 233-256 - 2017
Aurélien Baillon, Harris Schlesinger, Gijs van de Kuilen
We report the results from an experiment designed to measure attitudes towards ambiguity beyond ambiguity aversion. In particular, we implement recently-proposed model-free preference conditions of ambiguity prudence and ambiguity temperance. Ambiguity prudence has been shown to play an important role in precautionary behavior and the mere presence of ambiguity averse agents in markets. We observe...... hiện toàn bộ
Ostracism and theft in heterogeneous groupsExperimental Economics - Tập 26 - Trang 193-222 - 2022
Alexandra Baier, Loukas Balafoutas, Tarek Jaber-Lopez
Ostracism, or exclusion by peers, has been practiced since ancient times as a severe form of punishment against transgressors of laws or social norms. The purpose of this paper is to offer a comprehensive analysis on how ostracism affects behavior and the functioning of a social group. We present data from a laboratory experiment, in which participants face a social dilemma on how to allocate limi...... hiện toàn bộ
Strategic decisions: behavioral differences between CEOs and othersExperimental Economics - Tập 23 - Trang 154-180 - 2019
Håkan J. Holm, Victor Nee, Sonja Opper
We study whether CEOs of private firms differ from other people with regard to their strategic decisions and beliefs about others’ strategy choices. Such differences are interesting since CEOs make decisions that are economically more relevant, because they affect not only their own utility or the well-being of household members, but the utility of many stakeholders inside and outside of the organ...... hiện toàn bộ
Directional behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects in multiple repeated gamesExperimental Economics - Tập 22 - Trang 705-734 - 2018
Tracy Xiao Liu, Jenna Bednar, Yan Chen, Scott Page
In this study, we use a novel design to test for directional behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects in a set of multiple repeated games. Specifically, in our experiment, each subject plays a common historical game with two different matches for 100 rounds. After 100 rounds, the subject switches to a new game with one match and continues playing the historical game with the other match. Th...... hiện toàn bộ
Coordination and transferExperimental Economics - Tập 21 - Trang 487-512 - 2017
David J. Cooper, John Van Huyck
We study the ability of subjects to transfer principles between related coordination games. Subjects play a class of order statistic coordination games closely related to the well-known minimum (or weak-link) and median games (Van Huyck et al. in Am Econ Rev 80:234–248, 1990, Q J Econ 106(3):885–910, 1991). When subjects play a random sequence of games with differing order statistics, play is less...... hiện toàn bộ
Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum gamesExperimental Economics - Tập 9 - Trang 307-321 - 2006
James Andreoni, Emily Blanchard
We present an experiment designed to separate the two commonplace explanations for behavior in ultimatum games—subjects’ concern for fairness versus the failure of subgame perfection as an equilibrium refinement. We employ a tournament structure of the bargaining interaction to eliminate the potential for fairness to influence behavior. Comparing the results of the tournament game with two control...... hiện toàn bộ