Economica

  0013-0427

  1468-0335

  Anh Quốc

Cơ quản chủ quản:  Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd , WILEY

Lĩnh vực:
Economics and Econometrics

Các bài báo tiêu biểu

The Nature of the Firm
Tập 4 Số 16 - Trang 386-405 - 1937
Ronald H. Coase
International Corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign Investment
Tập 38 Số 149 - Trang 1 - 1971
Richard E. Caves
Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation and Optimal Unemployment over Time
Tập 34 Số 135 - Trang 254 - 1967
Edmund S. Phelps
Multinational Firms, Competition, and Productivity in Host-Country Markets
Tập 41 Số 162 - Trang 176 - 1974
Richard E. Caves
Rational Choice Functions and Orderings
Tập 26 Số 102 - Trang 121 - 1959
Kenneth J. Arrow
Being Independent is a Great Thing: Subjective Evaluations of Self‐Employment and Hierarchy
Tập 75 Số 298 - Trang 362-383 - 2008
Matthias Benz, Bruno S. Frey
One can be independent, or one can be subject to decisions made by others. This paper argues that this difference, embodied in the institutional distinction between the decision‐making procedures ‘market’ and ‘hierarchy’, affects individual wellbeing beyond outcomes. Taking self‐employment as an important case of independence, it is shown that the self‐employed derive higher satisfaction from work than those employed in organizations, irrespective of income gained or hours worked. This is evidence for procedural utility: people value not only outcomes, but also the processes leading to outcomes.
Inflation Expectations
Tập 42 Số 166 - Trang 123 - 1975
John A. Carlson, Michael Parkin
Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries
Tập 83 Số 330 - Trang 219-246 - 2016
Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, Emmanuel Saez
We develop an agency model explaining why third‐party information reporting by firms makes tax enforcement successful. While third‐party reporting would be ineffective with frictionless collusion between firms and employees, collusive evasion is impossible to sustain in firms with many employees and accurate business records as any single employee may reveal evasion. We embed our agency model into a macro model where the number of employees grows with development, showing that the tax take evolves as an S‐shape driven by changes in third‐party information. We show that our model is consistent with a set of stylized facts on taxation and development.
Interest Rate Pass‐Through and Monetary Transmission: Evidence from Individual Financial Institutions' Retail Rates
Tập 71 Số 281 - Trang 99-123 - 2004
Boris Hofmann, Paul Mizen
Official interest rate changes should influence short rates on money market instruments and retail products, such as deposit accounts and mortgages, but complete pass‐through is often taken for granted. This paper provides a theoretical and econometric framework for assessing the evidence for this assumption using seventeen years of monthly data for rates on thirteen deposit and mortgage products offered by individual UK financial institutions. The methodology allows for asymmetries and non‐linearities in adjustment and the results show that the speed of adjustment in retail rates depends on whether the perceived ‘gap’ between retail and base rates is widening or narrowing.
Bilateral Monopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical Integration
Tập 27 Số 106 - Trang 101 - 1960
Fritz Machlup, Martha V. Taber