Economic Theory
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Sequential innovation, naked exclusion, and upfront lump-sum payments
Economic Theory - - 2017
We present a potentially benign naked exclusion mechanism that can be applied to sequential innovation; a non-patentable original innovation by the incumbent supplier fosters derivative innovation by rivals. In the absence of an appropriate legal framework, the original innovator’s equilibrium exclusivity contracts block subsequent efficient entry even if there is (leader–follower) competition in ......
Bargaining, coalitions and competition
Economic Theory - Tập 15 - Trang 279-296 - 2000
We study a Gale-like matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof makes use of the theory of the core. With resp......
Multiple reserve requirements in a monetary growth model
Economic Theory - Tập 19 - Trang 791-810 - 2002
This paper considers a monetary growth model in which banks provide liquidity, and in which a government finances a deficit by printing money and selling bonds. In this context, I examine the possibility that the government may want to impose binding reserve requirements on banks' holdings of both money and government bonds. Conditions are established under which doing so increases steady state w......
Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result
Economic Theory - Tập 29 - Trang 721-726 - 2005
The present note analyzes the simultaneous ascending-bid auction with arbitrarily many asymmetric bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. In that unique equilibriu......
Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning
Economic Theory - Tập 33 - Trang 285-309 - 2006
We study a spatial model of political competition in which potential candidates need a fixed amount of money from lobbies to enter an election. We show that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in which lobbies finance candidates whose policies they prefer among the set of entrants coincides with the set of Nash equilibria with weakly less than two entering candidates. Fixing lobbies’ preferen......
Dynamic preference foundations of expected exponentially-discounted utilityAbstract Expected exponentially-discounted utility (EEDU) is the standard model of choice over risk and time in economics. This paper considers the dynamic preference foundations of EEDU in the timed risks framework. We first provide dynamic preference foundations for a time-invariant expected utility representation. The new axioms for this are called foregone-risk ... ...
Economic Theory -
Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods
Economic Theory - Tập 13 Số 3 - Trang 709-722 - 1999
Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs
Economic Theory - Tập 70 - Trang 765-783 - 2019
We analyze an all-pay auction as a game of incomplete information, in which every player knows the cost of his effort and believes that the cost to each of his rivals is an independent Pareto random variable. The lower bound of its support, the cost parameter, can be different for each player and all are commonly known. Such an auction has a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. The players with a rel......
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