Markov Perfect Equilibria in Multi-Mode Differential Games with Endogenous Timing of Mode TransitionsDynamic Games and Applications - Tập 12 - Trang 363-393 - 2021
Herbert Dawid, Serhat Gezer
We study Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) of two-player multi-mode differential games with controlled state dynamics, where one player controls the transition between modes. Different types of MPE are characterized distinguishing between delay equilibria, inducing for some initial conditions mode switches after a positive finite delay, and now or never equilibria, under which, depending on the init...... hiện toàn bộ
Climate Engineering in an Interconnected World: The Role of TariffsDynamic Games and Applications - Tập 8 - Trang 573-587 - 2018
Markus Eigruber, Franz Wirl
This paper investigates strategic trade policies as a response to negative externalities linked to climate engineering. Parties negatively affected, or which only perceive damages, may react to geoengineering by deploying trade sanctions, i.e. the imposition of tariffs. By introducing a dynamic trade model, we show that geoengineering-averse countries have an incentive to implement or increase exi...... hiện toàn bộ
Fixation Probabilities of Strategies for Bimatrix Games in Finite PopulationsDynamic Games and Applications - Tập 7 - Trang 93-111 - 2015
Takuya Sekiguchi, Hisashi Ohtsuki
Recent developments in stochastic evolutionary game theory in finite populations yield insights that complement the conventional deterministic evolutionary game theory in infinite populations. However, most studies of stochastic evolutionary game theory have investigated dynamics of symmetric games, although not all social and biological phenomena are described by symmetric games, e.g., social int...... hiện toàn bộ
Some Game-Theoretic Remarks on Two-Player Generalized Cops and Robbers GamesDynamic Games and Applications - Tập 11 - Trang 785-802 - 2021
Georgios Konstantinidis, Athanasios Kehagias
In this paper, we study the two-player generalized cops and robbers (GCR) games introduced by Bonato and MacGillivray. Our main goals are to provide: (a) a game-theoretic formulation of GCR and (b) a self-contained game-theoretic proof that GCR has a value and an optimal strategy profile. To achieve our goals, we first formulate GCR (and CR as a special case) as a zero-sum stochastic game. Then we...... hiện toàn bộ
Signed Network Formation Games and Clustering BalanceDynamic Games and Applications - Tập 10 - Trang 783-797 - 2020
Pedro Cisneros-Velarde, Francesco Bullo
We propose a signed network formation game, in which pairs of individuals strategically change the signs of the edges in a complete network. These individuals are members of a social network who strategically reduce cognitive dissonances by changing their interpersonal appraisals. We characterize the best-response dynamics for this game and prove that its implementation can dynamically drive the n...... hiện toàn bộ
Oligopoly Pricing and Advertising in Isoelastic Adoption ModelsDynamic Games and Applications - Tập 5 - Trang 334-360 - 2014
Kurt Helmes, Rainer Schlosser
This paper deals with deterministic dynamic pricing and advertising differential games which are stylized models of special durable-good oligopoly markets. We analyze infinite horizon models with constant price and advertising elasticities of demand in the cases of symmetric and asymmetric firms. In particular, we consider general saturation/adoption effects. These effects are modeled as transform...... hiện toàn bộ
Optimality, Equilibrium, and Curb Sets in Decision Problems Without CommitmentDynamic Games and Applications - Tập 10 - Trang 478-492 - 2019
P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Andrey Meshalkin, Arkadi Predtetchinski
The paper considers a class of decision problems with an infinite time horizon that contains Markov decision problems as an important special case. Our interest concerns the case where the decision maker cannot commit himself to his future action choices. We model the decision maker as consisting of multiple selves, where each history of the decision problem corresponds to one self. Each self is a...... hiện toàn bộ