The Classical Homicidal Chauffeur GameDynamic Games and Applications - Tập 9 - Trang 800-850 - 2018
Meir Pachter, Sean Coates
The Homicidal Chauffeur differential game is often mentioned in the literature, but the game’s complete solution is not readily available. In this work, the complete solution process of the Homicidal Chauffeur differential game is illustrated for the parameter range in the heart of the speed ratio-capture radius parameter space initially investigated by Isaacs, and referred to by Breakwell and Mer...... hiện toàn bộ
The Evolution of Coercive Institutional PunishmentDynamic Games and Applications - Tập 2 - Trang 97-109 - 2011
Alexander Isakov, David G. Rand
Institutional punishment plays a central role in human societies. Yet research in evolutionary game theory has focused almost exclusively on peer punishment. Here we present a model for the evolution of institutional punishment. We consider a set of states (“kingdoms”), each consisting of a number of individuals (“subjects”) and a single leader (“king”). Subjects choose how much to pay to the king...... hiện toàn bộ
Markov Perfect Equilibria in Multi-Mode Differential Games with Endogenous Timing of Mode TransitionsDynamic Games and Applications - Tập 12 - Trang 363-393 - 2021
Herbert Dawid, Serhat Gezer
We study Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) of two-player multi-mode differential games with controlled state dynamics, where one player controls the transition between modes. Different types of MPE are characterized distinguishing between delay equilibria, inducing for some initial conditions mode switches after a positive finite delay, and now or never equilibria, under which, depending on the init...... hiện toàn bộ
Climate Engineering in an Interconnected World: The Role of TariffsDynamic Games and Applications - Tập 8 - Trang 573-587 - 2018
Markus Eigruber, Franz Wirl
This paper investigates strategic trade policies as a response to negative externalities linked to climate engineering. Parties negatively affected, or which only perceive damages, may react to geoengineering by deploying trade sanctions, i.e. the imposition of tariffs. By introducing a dynamic trade model, we show that geoengineering-averse countries have an incentive to implement or increase exi...... hiện toàn bộ
Fixation Probabilities of Strategies for Bimatrix Games in Finite PopulationsDynamic Games and Applications - Tập 7 - Trang 93-111 - 2015
Takuya Sekiguchi, Hisashi Ohtsuki
Recent developments in stochastic evolutionary game theory in finite populations yield insights that complement the conventional deterministic evolutionary game theory in infinite populations. However, most studies of stochastic evolutionary game theory have investigated dynamics of symmetric games, although not all social and biological phenomena are described by symmetric games, e.g., social int...... hiện toàn bộ