China Quarterly

Until the Cultural Revolution, the predominant western view of contemporary Chinese elite conflict was that it consisted of “discussion” (t'ao-lun) within a basically consensual Politburo among shifting “opinion groups” with no “organized force” behind them. The purges and accusations which began in 1965 and apparently still continue, have shaken this interpretation, and a number of scholars have advanced new analyses - sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, sometimes of general application, sometimes applied only to a particular time span or segment of the political system. Of these new views, perhaps the most systematic - and at the same time the one which represents the least change from the pre-Cultural Revolution “opinion group” model - is the “policy making under Mao” interpretation, which sees conflict as essentially a bureaucratic decision-making process dominated by Mao.

An organization must have rules, and so must a state. A constitution is a set of general rules, it is the fundamental law.… Constitution-making is a matter of science.Mao Tse-tung On 5 March 1978 the People's Republic of China promulgated its second constitution in little more than three years and the third since its establishment in 1949. What functions does a constitution serve in the Chinese political-legal system? Is it a sham not worth the paper on which it is printed? Is it an artifice of propaganda designed to impress and mislead foreigners? Does it have legal as well as political significance? The 1954 Constitution was not revised for two decades – why then was its 1975 successor so quickly overtaken by events? What are the differences among these basic documents?

This article analyses Chinese local people's congresses' supervision of governments in order to see whether people's congresses have played a meaningful role in the reform era. The article will show that the main strategies of people's congresses have been to gain the support of the Chinese Communist Party and to co-operate with governments, rather than to use confrontation, in an effort to overcome their lower political status. But after primarily achieving these goals by the early 1990s, people's congresses have also started to employ the confrontation strategy towards governments. At the same time, people's congresses have actively pioneered new supervisory measures so that they overcome current problematic legal and legislative systems. As a result, legislative supervision began to influence governments and officials significantly in the early 1990s. So people's congresses, along with the Party and governments, have become important political actors in local politics, even though they are not as influential as the other two institutions.

This article examines the privatization of China's township enterprises. According to our survey of 670 firms in 15 randomly selected counties in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, more than half of the firms owned by local government were completely privatized by 1999. The privatization process is striking for two reasons. First, local governments almost always sold firms to insiders, while in the rest of the world privatization largely involves outsiders. Secondly, unlike the predictions of some academics and policy makers, many privatized firms have experienced an increase in performance. Drawing on firm-level survey data and extensive interviews with government leaders and managers, we found that leaders devised a way to elicit information from the buyer at the time of the sale about the firm's future profitability that enabled them to execute privatization successfully. Our analysis shows that the performance of firms with new owners that paid a price for the firm that exceeded the book value of its assets is on par with the performance of private firms after privatization since they also received strong incentives.

All states have a role in development, but this varies widely. The spectrum is defined at one end by thelaissez faireminimalist state whose role is limited to ensuring a stable and secure environment so that contracts, property rights and other institutions of the market can be honoured. At the opposite end are the centrally planned Leninist states that directly replace the market with bureaucratic allocation and planning. Between these two extremes are the capitalist developmental states of Japan and the East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) that are neither Communist norlaissez faire, but exhibit characteristics of both. The state plays an activist, rather than a minimalist, role; there is planning, but it is geared toward creating maximum competitive and comparative advantage for manufacturers within a market economy.

With a total population of over a billion people, China requires vast supplies of energy for industrial and economic development. Indeed, in absolute terms, the country ranks third to the United States and the former Soviet Union as a producer and consumer of energy resources. Nevertheless, its per capita energy consumption remains extremely low even for a developing country.

We employ survey data collected in 2001 in Zhejiang province to investigate patterns and determinants of land market development. Previous studies have noted the correlation between growth of off-farm jobs and rental-market development at the aggregate level, but failed empirically to demonstrate mechanisms at the disaggregate level. Our analyses find concrete evidence at the household level connecting developments in labour and land markets. Growth in off-farm jobs allow rural households to transfer labour out of farming and prompt them to relinquish land rights, generating a supply of land that drives rental activities. We also go beyond interactions between factor markets and examine how local institution building promotes rental-market development. Institutions that either lower transaction costs or secure property rights are found to be crucial in explaining cross-regional variations in rental-market development. Finally, the rise of land rental markets also highlights the role of collective ownership in shaping rural development trajectory.

Hydropower dams are back in the spotlight owing to a shifting preference for low carbon energy generation and their possible contribution to mitigating climate change. At the forefront of the renaissance of large hydropower dams are Chinese companies, as the builders of the world's largest dams at home and abroad, opening up opportunities for low- and middle-income countries. However, large hydropower dams, despite their possible developmental and carbon reduction contributions, are accompanied by huge economic costs, profound negative environmental changes and social impacts. Using fieldwork data from four hydropower projects in Ghana, Nigeria, Cambodia and Malaysia, this paper evaluates the behaviour of Chinese stakeholders engaged in large hydropower projects in Asia and Africa. We do this by first exploring the interests of the different Chinese stakeholders and then by investigating the wider implications of these Chinese dams on the local, national and international contexts. The paper concludes that hydropower dams will continue to play a prominent role in future efforts to increase energy security and reduce energy poverty worldwide, therefore the planning, building and mitigation strategies need to be implemented in a more sustainable way that takes into account national development priorities, the needs of local people and the impacts on natural habitats.

This article uses a case study approach to examine the processes and consequences of pollution enforcement in an industrial township in rural Sichuan. China's national pollution emissions standards are relatively strict, but enforcement is the responsibility of some 2,500 Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) within municipal and county governments. EPB officials exercise considerable discretion in prioritizing and carrying out enforcement activities, but exactly what factors influence regulatory behaviour within EPBs is poorly understood. Data for the article are drawn from interviews with EBP officials, township government officials, industrial managers and local residents, as well as a review of township and district financial records and pollution enforcement records. In this case study, EPB enforcement priorities and actions were guided by State Council directives and State Environmental Protection Administration policy, but citizen complaints and media exposure regarding polluting factories also played a key role, and action culminated in the forced closure of township factories. The article uses political ecology as an analytical framework for understanding how pollution enforcement is shaped by the competing values, goals and priorities within the EPB and the administrative unit in which it operates. This is crucial in China, where the decentralized nature of environmental oversight requires an examination of both policy formulation and implementation. The implications of pollution enforcement on rural enterprises for ecological health, fiscal revenue and rural development are also discussed.

The shift in Beijing's priorities to more balanced and people-oriented development has led some localities to make more efforts in developing social policy areas. By investigating the personnel institution, a political incentive mechanism, this article aims to shed light on the structure of political incentives in China and why local political leaders improve public welfare in a non-democratic setting. A content analysis of 69 regulations that cover one-third of all municipal leaders shows that the formal evaluation rules for leaders in some localities have become more welfare-oriented to reflect Beijing's new focus on social policy areas. A statistical analysis further reveals that different political incentives operate for municipal Party leaders and mayors, and that political incentives to develop social policy vary across geographic regions. The statistical analysis exploits an original dataset I compiled from an online archive and statistical yearbooks, and contains biographic and career history data on municipal leaders between 2003 and 2010.