Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Công bố khoa học tiêu biểu
* Dữ liệu chỉ mang tính chất tham khảo
Sắp xếp:
Cultural universality of any theory of human intelligence remains an open question
Behavioral and Brain Sciences - Tập 3 Số 4 - Trang 584-585 - 1980
Testosterone và Địa Vị Thống Trị ở Nam Giới Ở nam giới, hàm lượng testosterone nội sinh (T) cao dường như khuyến khích hành vi nhằm thống trị – để nâng cao vị thế của một người hơn so với người khác. Đôi khi hành vi thống trị có tính chất hung hăng, với ý định rõ ràng nhằm gây hại cho người khác, nhưng thường thì sự thống trị được thể hiện một cách không hung hăng. Đôi khi hành vi thống trị có hình thức hành vi phản xã hội, bao gồm nổi loạn chống lại quyền lực và vi phạm pháp luật. Đo lường T tại một thời điểm nhất định, có thể cho thấy mức độ T cơ bản của một người đàn ông, có thể dự đoán nhiều hành vi thống trị hoặc phản xã hội này. T không chỉ ảnh hưởng đến hành vi mà còn phản ứng lại với nó. Hành động cạnh tranh để đạt được địa vị thống trị ảnh hưởng đến mức T của nam giới theo hai cách. Thứ nhất, T tăng lên khi đương đầu với thách thức, như thể đó là phản ứng dự đoán trước cuộc cạnh tranh sắp tới. Thứ hai, sau cuộc cạnh tranh, T tăng lên ở người thắng cuộc và giảm ở người thua cuộc. Do đó, có một sự tương tác qua lại giữa T và hành vi thống trị, mỗi yếu tố ảnh hưởng lẫn nhau. Chúng tôi đối chiếu một mô hình tương tác , trong đó mức T là biến đổi, vừa là nguyên nhân và là kết quả của hành vi, với một mô hình cơ bản , trong đó mức T được giả định là một đặc điểm dai dẳng ảnh hưởng đến hành vi. Một bộ dữ liệu đặc biệt về cựu chiến binh Không quân, trong đó dữ liệu được thu thập bốn lần trong một thập kỷ, cho phép chúng tôi so sánh mô hình cơ bản và mô hình tương tác như một lời giải thích cho mối quan hệ giữa T và ly hôn. Chúng tôi thảo luận ý nghĩa xã hội học của những mô hình này.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences - Tập 21 Số 3 - Trang 353-363 - 1998
#Testosterone #hành vi thống trị #hành vi phản xã hội #mô hình tương tác #ly hôn #Không quân #hành vi xã hội #vi phạm pháp luật
Processing capacity defined by relational complexity: Implications for comparative, developmental, and cognitive psychology Working memory limits are best defined in terms of the
complexity of the relations that can be processed in parallel.
Complexity is defined as the number of related dimensions or sources
of variation. A unary relation has one argument and one source of
variation; its argument can be instantiated in only one way at a time.
A binary relation has two arguments, two sources of variation, and
two instantiations, and so on. Dimensionality is related to the number
of chunks, because both attributes on dimensions and chunks are
independent units of information of arbitrary size. Studies of working
memory limits suggest that there is a soft limit corresponding to the
parallel processing of one quaternary relation. More complex concepts
are processed by “segmentation” or “conceptual
chunking.” In segmentation, tasks are broken into components
that do not exceed processing capacity and can be processed serially.
In conceptual chunking, representations are “collapsed”
to reduce their dimensionality and hence their processing load, but at
the cost of making some relational information inaccessible. Neural
net models of relational representations show that relations with
more arguments have a higher computational cost that coincides with
experimental findings on higher processing loads in humans. Relational
complexity is related to processing load in reasoning and sentence
comprehension and can distinguish between the capacities of higher
species. The complexity of relations processed by children increases
with age. Implications for neural net models and theories of cognition
and cognitive development are discussed.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences - Tập 21 Số 6 - Trang 803-831 - 1998
Mental imagery: In search of a theory It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and ones that are attributable to tacit knowledge used to simulate what would happen in a visual situation. With this distinction in mind, the paper then considers in detail the widely held assumption that in some important sense images are spatially displayed or are depictive, and that examining images uses the same mechanisms that are deployed in visual perception. I argue that the assumption of the spatial or depictive nature of images is only explanatory if taken literally, as a claim about how images are physically instantiated in the brain, and that the literal view fails for a number of empirical reasons – for example, because of the cognitive penetrability of the phenomena cited in its favor. Similarly, while it is arguably the case that imagery and vision involve some of the same mechanisms, this tells us very little about the nature of mental imagery and does not support claims about the pictorial nature of mental images. Finally, I consider whether recent neuroscience evidence clarifies the debate over the nature of mental images. I claim that when such questions as whether images are depictive or spatial are formulated more clearly, the evidence does not provide support for the picture-theory over a symbol-structure theory of mental imagery. Even if all the empirical claims were true, they do not warrant the conclusion that many people have drawn from them: that mental images are depictive or are displayed in some (possibly cortical) space. Such a conclusion is incompatible with what is known about how images function in thought. We are then left with the provisional counterintuitive conclusion that the available evidence does not support rejection of what I call the “null hypothesis”; namely, that reasoning with mental images involves the same form of representation and the same processes as that of reasoning in general, except that the content or subject matter of thoughts experienced as images includes information about how things would look.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences - Tập 25 Số 2 - Trang 157-182 - 2002
Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate Abstract Economists and biologists have proposed a distinction between two mechanisms – “strong” and “weak” reciprocity – that may explain the evolution of human sociality. Weak reciprocity theorists emphasize the benefits of long-term cooperation and the use of low-cost strategies to deter free-riders. Strong reciprocity theorists, in contrast, claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. To support this claim, they have generated a large body of evidence concerning the willingness of experimental subjects to punish uncooperative free-riders at a cost to themselves. In this article, I distinguish between a “narrow” and a “wide” reading of the experimental evidence. Under the narrow reading, punishment experiments are just useful devices to measure psychological propensities in controlled laboratory conditions. Under the wide reading, they replicate a mechanism that supports cooperation also in “real-world” situations outside the laboratory. I argue that the wide interpretation must be tested using a combination of laboratory data and evidence about cooperation “in the wild.” In spite of some often-repeated claims, there is no evidence that cooperation in the small egalitarian societies studied by anthropologists is enforced by means of costly punishment. Moreover, studies by economic and social historians show that social dilemmas in the wild are typically solved by institutions that coordinate punishment, reduce its cost, and extend the horizon of cooperation. The lack of field evidence for costly punishment suggests important constraints about what forms of cooperation can or cannot be sustained by means of decentralised policing.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences - Tập 35 Số 1 - Trang 1-15 - 2012
Toward a second-person neuroscience Abstract In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could – paradoxically – be seen as representing the “dark matter” of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations that allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies, and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really “go social”; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences - Tập 36 Số 4 - Trang 393-414 - 2013
The sociobiology of sociopathy: An integrated evolutionary model Abstract Sociopaths are “outstanding” members of society in two senses: politically, they draw our attention because of the inordinate amount of crime they commit, and psychologically, they hold our fascination because most ofus cannot fathom the cold, detached way they repeatedly harm and manipulate others. Proximate explanations from behavior genetics, child development, personality theory, learning theory, and social psychology describe a complex interaction of genetic and physiological risk factors with demographic and micro environmental variables that predispose a portion of the population to chronic antisocial behavior. More recent, evolutionary and game theoretic models have tried to present an ultimate explanation of sociopathy as the expression of a frequency-dependent life strategy which is selected, in dynamic equilibrium, in response to certain varying environmental circumstances. This paper tries to integrate the proximate, developmental models with the ultimate, evolutionary ones, suggesting that two developmentally different etiologies of sociopathy emerge from two different evolutionary mechanisms. Social strategies for minimizing the incidence of sociopathic behavior in modern society should consider the two different etiologies and the factors that contribute to them.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences - Tập 18 Số 3 - Trang 523-541 - 1995
Depression: The predisposing influence of stress Abstract Aversive experiences have been thought to provoke or exacerbate clinical depression. The present review provides a brief survey of the stress-depression literature and suggests that the effects of stressful experiences on affective state may be related to depletion of several neurotransmitters, including norepinephrine, dopamine, and serotonin. A major element in determining the neurochemical changes is the organism's ability to cope with the aversive stimuli through behavioral means. Aversive experiences give rise to behavioral attempts to cope with the stressor, coupled with increased utilization and synthesis of brain amines to contend with environmental demands. When behavioral coping is possible, neurochemical systems are not overly taxed, and behavioral pathology will not ensue. However, when there can be no behavioral control over the stressful stimuli, or when the aversive experience is perceived as uncontrollable, increased emphasis is placed on coping through endogenous neurochemical mechanisms. Amine utilization increases appreciably and may exceed synthesis, resulting in a net reduction of amine stores, which in turn promotes or exacerbates affective disorder. The processes governing the depletions may be subject to sensitization or conditioning, such that exposure to traumatic experiences may have long-term repercussions when the organism subsequently encounters related stressful stimuli. With continued uncontrollable stimulation, adaptation occurs in the form of increased activity of synthetic enzymes, and levels of amines approach basal values. It is suggested that either the initial amine depletion provoked by aversive experiences or a dysfunction of the adaptive processes, resulting in persistent amine depletion, contributes to behavioral depression. Aside from the contribution of behavioral coping, several organismic, experiential, and environmental variables will influence the effects of aversive experiences on neurochemical activity, and may thus influence vulnerability to depression.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences - Tập 5 Số 1 - Trang 89-99 - 1982
Event-related potentials and cognition: A critique of the context updating hypothesis and an alternative interpretation of P3
Behavioral and Brain Sciences - Tập 11 Số 03 - Trang 343 - 1988
The propositional nature of human associative learning Abstract The past 50 years have seen an accumulation of evidence suggesting that associative learning depends on high-level cognitive processes that give rise to propositional knowledge. Yet, many learning theorists maintain a belief in a learning mechanism in which links between mental representations are formed automatically. We characterize and highlight the differences between the propositional and link approaches, and review the relevant empirical evidence. We conclude that learning is the consequence of propositional reasoning processes that cooperate with the unconscious processes involved in memory retrieval and perception. We argue that this new conceptual framework allows many of the important recent advances in associative learning research to be retained, but recast in a model that provides a firmer foundation for both immediate application and future research.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences - Tập 32 Số 2 - Trang 183-198 - 2009
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