Accounting Review

This paper suggests a new measure of one aspect of the quality of working capital accruals and earnings. One role of accruals is to shift or adjust the recognition of cash flows over time so that the adjusted numbers (earnings) better measure firm performance. However, accruals require assumptions and estimates of future cash flows. We argue that the quality of accruals and earnings is decreasing in the magnitude of estimation error in accruals. We derive an empirical measure of accrual quality as the residuals from firm-specific regressions of changes in working capital on past, present, and future operating cash flows. We document that observable firm characteristics can be used as instruments for accrual quality (e.g., volatility of accruals and volatility of earnings). Finally, we show that our measure of accrual quality is positively related to earnings persistence.

We document that accrual-based earnings management increased steadily from 1987 until the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, followed by a significant decline after the passage of SOX. Conversely, the level of real earnings management activities declined prior to SOX and increased significantly after the passage of SOX, suggesting that firms switched from accrual-based to real earnings management methods after the passage of SOX. We also document that the accrual-based earnings management activities were particularly high in the period immediately preceding SOX. Consistent with these results, we find that firms that just achieved important earnings benchmarks used less accruals and more real earnings management after SOX when compared to similar firms before SOX. In addition, our analysis provides evidence that the increases in accrual-based earnings management in the period preceding SOX were concurrent with increases in equity-based compensation. Our results suggest that stock-option components provide a differential set of incentives with regard to accrual-based earnings management. We document that while new options granted during the current period are negatively associated with income-increasing accrual-based earnings management, unexercised options are positively associated with income-increasing accrual-based earnings management.

We develop and describe a new measure of long-run corporate tax avoidance that is based on the ability to pay a low amount of cash taxes per dollar of pre-tax earnings over long time periods. We label this measure the “long-run cash effective tax rate.” We use the long-run cash effective tax rate to examine (1) the extent to which some firms are able to avoid taxes over periods as long as ten years, and (2) how predictive one-year tax rates are for long-run tax avoidance. In our sample of 2,077 firms, we find there is considerable cross-sectional variation in tax avoidance. For example, approximately one-fourth of our sample firms are able to maintain long-run cash effective tax rates below 20 percent, compared to a sample mean tax rate of approximately 30 percent. We also find that annual cash effective tax rates are not very good predictors of long-run cash effective tax rates and, thus, are not accurate proxies for long-run tax avoidance. While there is some evidence of persistence in annual cash effective tax rates, the persistence is asymmetric. Low annual cash effective tax rates are more persistent than are high annual cash effective tax rates. An initial examination of characteristics of firms successful at keeping their cash effective tax rates low over long periods shows that they are well spread across industries but with some clustering.

This paper examines how capital market pressures and institutional factors shape firms' incentives to report earnings that reflect economic performance. To isolate the effects of reporting incentives, we exploit the fact that, within the European Union, privately held corporations face the same accounting standards as publicly traded companies because accounting regulation is based on legal form. We focus on the level of earnings management as one dimension of accounting quality that is particularly responsive to firms' reporting incentives. We document that private firms exhibit higher levels of earnings management and that strong legal systems are associated with less earnings management in private and public firms. We also provide evidence that private and public firms respond differentially to institutional factors, such as book-tax alignment, outside investor protection, and capital market structure. Moreover, legal institutions and capital market forces often appear to reinforce each other.

This paper challenges the findings of Frankel et al. (2002) (FJN). The results of our discretionary accruals tests differ from FJN's when we adjust discretionary current accruals for firm performance. In our earnings benchmark tests, in contrast to FJN we find no statistically significant association between firms meeting analyst forecasts and auditor fees. Our market reaction tests also provide different results than those reported by FJN. Overall, our study indicates that FJN's results are sensitive to research design choices, and we find no systematic evidence supporting their claim that auditors violate their independence as a result of clients purchasing relatively more nonaudit services.

Dechow and Dichev (2002) model earnings quality as the magnitude of estimation errors in accruals, and provide empirical estimates of this construct based on the relation between accruals and cash flows. I characterize the innovation and limitations in this approach, and provide empirical evidence of measurement error in their empirical specification. I also adapt their model to assess the specification of the Jones' (1991) model and document that this model provides estimates of discretionary accruals that are significantly associated with cash flows, which are likely to be substantially nondiscretionary. I conclude with suggestions for future research on earnings quality and earnings management.

This paper examines the link between managers' equity incentives—arising from stock-based compensation and stock ownership—and earnings management. We hypothesize that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to sell shares in the future and this motivates these managers to engage in earnings management to increase the value of the shares to be sold. Using stock-based compensation and stock ownership data over the 1993–2000 time period, we document that managers with high equity incentives sell more shares in subsequent periods. As expected, we find that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to report earnings that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts. We also find that managers with consistently high equity incentives are less likely to report large positive earnings surprises. This finding is consistent with the wealth of these managers being more sensitive to future stock performance, which leads to increased reserving of current earnings to avoid future earnings disappointments. Collectively, our results indicate that equity incentives lead to incentives for earnings management.

This study explains the challenges associated with the Heckman (1979) procedure to control for selection bias, assesses the quality of its application in accounting research, and offers guidance for better implementation of selection models. A survey of 75 recent accounting articles in leading journals reveals that many researchers implement the technique in a mechanical way with relatively little appreciation of important econometric issues and problems surrounding its use. Using empirical examples motivated by prior research, we illustrate that selection models are fragile and can yield quite literally any possible outcome in response to fairly minor changes in model specification. We conclude with guidance on how researchers can better implement selection models that will provide more convincing evidence on potential selection bias, including the need to justify model specifications and careful sensitivity analyses with respect to robustness and multicollinearity.

Data Availability: Data used are available from public sources identified in the study.

Propensity score matching (PSM) has become a popular technique for estimating average treatment effects (ATEs) in accounting research. In this study, we discuss the usefulness and limitations of PSM relative to more traditional multiple regression (MR) analysis. We discuss several PSM design choices and review the use of PSM in 86 articles in leading accounting journals from 2008–2014. We document a significant increase in the use of PSM from zero studies in 2008 to 26 studies in 2014. However, studies often oversell the capabilities of PSM, fail to disclose important design choices, and/or implement PSM in a theoretically inconsistent manner. We then empirically illustrate complications associated with PSM in three accounting research settings. We first demonstrate that when the treatment is not binary, PSM tends to confine analyses to a subsample of observations where the effect size is likely to be smallest. We also show that seemingly innocuous design choices greatly influence sample composition and estimates of the ATE. We conclude with suggestions for future research considering the use of matching methods.

Data Availability: All data used are available from sources cited in the text.

ABSTRACT: Globally, companies increasingly publish separate general purpose, nonfinancial (sustainability) reports. Some of these are independently assured and assurers may or may not be from the auditing profession. We seek to understand this emerging voluntary assurance market. Using a sample of 2,113 companies (from 31 countries) that produced sustainability reports between 2002–2004, we use sequential logit analysis to identify the factors associated with the decision to voluntarily purchase assurance and the choice of assurance provider. We hypothesize that a company's need to enhance credibility through assurance and choice of assurance provider will be a function of company-, industry-, and country-related factors. Our results support the argument that companies seeking to enhance the credibility of their reports and build their corporate reputation are more likely to have their sustainability reports assured, although it does not matter whether the assurance provider comes from the auditing profession. We also find that companies operating in stakeholder-orientated countries are more likely to choose the auditing profession as an assurer.