Zeuthen–Hicks Bargaining in Electronic Negotiations

Bishop RL (1964) A Zeuthen–Hicks theory of bargaining. Econometrica 32:410–417 Bognanno MF, Dworkin JBC (1975) Who “wins” in wage bargaining? Comment. Ind Labor Relat Rev 28(4):570–572 Bowlby RL, Schriver WRC (1978) Bluffing and the “split-the-difference” theory of wage bargaining. Ind Labor Relat Rev 31(2):161–171 Brooks JM, Dor A, Wong HS (1997) Hospital-insurer bargaining: an empirical investigation of appendectomy pricing. J Health Econ 16(4):417–434 Brooks JM, Doucette W, Sorofman B (1999) Factors affecting bargaining outcomes between pharmacies and insurers. Health Serv Res 34(1 Pt 2):439–451 Chambers CP, Echenique F (2014) On the consistency of data with bargaining theories. Theor Econ 9(1):137–162 Dias L, Vetschera R (2018) Multiple local optima in Zeuthen–Hicks bargaining: an analysis of different preference models. EURO J Decis Processes. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40070-018-0089-0 Fandel G (1985) On the applicability of group decision-making concepts to wage bargaining. In: Haimes YY, Chankong V (eds) Decision making with multiple objectives. Springer, Berlin, pp 532–548 Filzmoser M, Vetschera R (2008) A classification of bargaining steps and their impact on negotiation outcomes. Group Decis Negot 17(5):421–443 Hamermesh DS (1973) Who “wins” in wage bargaining? ILR Rev 26(4):1146–1149 Harsanyi JC (1956) Approaches to the bargaining problem before and after the theory of games: a critical discussion of Zeuthen’s, Hicks’, and Nash’s theories. Econometrica 24(2):144–157 Hindriks K, Jonker CM, Tykhonov D (2007) Negotiation dynamics: analysis, concession tactics, and outcomes. In: Lin TYT, Bradshaw JM, Klusch M, Zhang C, Broder A, Ho H (eds) Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE/WIC/ACM international conference on intelligent agent technology. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, pp 427–433 Kersten G, Noronha S (1999) WWW-based negotiation support: design, implementation, and use. Decis Support Syst 25(2):135–154 Kersten GE, Gimon D, Vahidov R (2012) Concession patterns in multi-issue negotiations and reverse auctions. In: Kauffman RJ (ed) International conference on electronic commerce, ICEC 2012, Singapore, pp 127–133 Lewicki RJ, Weiss SE, Lewin D (1992) Models of conflict, negotiation and third party intervention: a review and synthesis. J Organ Behav 13(3):209–252 Maechler M, Rousseeuw P, Croux C, Todorov V, Ruckstuhl A, Salibian-Barrera M, Verbeke T, Koller M, Conceicao E, di Palma MA (2018) robustbase: basic robust statistics R package. https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=robustbase. Accessed 13 Nov 2018 Maude-Griffin R, Feldman R, Wholey D (2004) Nash bargaining model of HMO premiums. Appl Econ 36(12):1329–1336 Nash JF (1950) The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18(2):155–162 Oliva TA, Leap TL (1981) A typology of metamodels in collective bargaining. Behav Sci 26(4):337–345 R Core Team (2018) R: a language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing. Vienna. https://www.R-project.org/. Accessed 23 July 2018 Roszkowska E, Wachowicz T, Kersten G (2017) Can the holistic preference elicitation be used to determine an accurate negotiation offer scoring system? A comparison of direct rating and UTASTAR techniques. In: Schoop M, Kilgour DM (eds) Group decision and negotiation—a socio-technical perspective. Lecture notes in business information processing, LNBIP, vol 293. Springer, Berlin, pp 202–214 Rubinstein A (1982) Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50(1):97–109 Svejnar J (1980) On the empirical testing of the Nash–Zeuthen bargaining solution. Ind Labor Relat Rev 33(4):536–542 Svejnar J (1986) Bargaining power, fear of disagreement, and wage settlements: theory and evidence from U.S. industry. Econometrica 54(5):1055–1078 Vetschera R (2013) Negotiation processes: an integrated perspective. Eur J Decis Processes 1(1–2):135–164 Zeuthen F (1930) Problems of monopoly and economic warfare. Routledge, London