Wily welfare capitalist: Werner von Siemens and the pension plan
Tóm tắt
The German firm of Siemens and Halske introduced many enterprising features of what later came to be known as welfare capitalism in the mid-nineteenth century. Profit sharing, annual bonuses, a pension fund, a reduction in work hours, and an annual party were all means to ensure a productive, trouble-free workforce. We investigate the reasons why Siemens and Halske introduced this internal welfare system. We focus on the by-far most expensive part of the welfare system: the pension fund introduced in 1872, more than a decade before the nationwide social security system was implemented in Germany. We find that the adoption of the internal welfare system increased labor productivity, and in addition discouraged workers from striking. We estimate that the company’s gains due to strike prevention and higher productivity were at least as high as the cost of the pension fund. This suggests that (1) the introduction of a pension fund is not inconsistent with simple profit maximizing behavior on the firm’s side and (2) increased labor unionization induced firms to introduce subjective components of workers’ remuneration packages.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Baker G, Gibbons R, Murphy K (1994) Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts. Quart J Econ 109(4):1125–1156
Benston G, Bromwich M, Litan R, Wagenhofer A (2006) Worldwide financial reporting: the development and future of accounting standards. Oxford University Press, New York
Berghahn V (2005) Imperial Germany, 1871–1918: economy, society, culture, and politic. Berghahn Books, New York
Berkowitz E, McQuaid K (1978) Businessman and bureaucrat: the evolution of the American social welfare system, 1900–1940. J Econ Hist 38:120–142
Bjork G (1966) Welfare policy and economic development: a comparative historical perspective: discussion. J Econ Hist 26:572–576
Brose E (1997) German history 1789–1871: from the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich. Berghahn Books, Oxford
Burhenne K (1932) Werner Siemens als Sozialpolitiker. C.HBeck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munich
Chandler A (1990) Scale and scope: the dynamics of industrial capitalism. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Conrad C (1986) Erfolgsbeteiligung und Vermögensbildung der Arbeitnehmer bei Seimens (1847–1945). Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden
Costas I (1992) Management and labor in the siemens plant in Berlin (1906–1920). In: Haimson L, Giulio S (eds) Strikes, social conflict and the first world war. An international perspective. Fondazione Giangiacomo Foltrinelli, Milan
Feldenkirchen W (1994) Werner von Siemens: inventor and international entrepreneur. Ohio State University Press, Columbus
Freeman R, Medoff J (1984) What do unions do? Basic Books, New York
Gibbons R (1987) Piece-rate incentive schemes. J Labor Econ 5:413–429
Hannah L (1986) Inventing retirement: the development of occupational pensions in Britain. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Hansen L (1982) Large sample properties of generalized method of moments. Econometrica 50:1029–1054
Hohorst G, Kocka J, Ritter GA (1975) Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch (Materialien zur Statistik der Kaiserreichs 1870–1914). C.H.Beck, Munich
Ichniowski C, Shaw K, Prennushi G (1997) The effects of human resource management practices on productivity: a study of steel finishing lines. Am Econ Rev 87:291–313
Jacoby S (1993) Employers and the welfare state: the role of Marion B. Folsom. J Am Hist 80:525–556
Khoudour-Castéras D (2008) Welfare state and labor mobility: the impact of Bismarck’s social legislation on german immigration before World War 1. J Econ Hist 68(1):211–243
Kleiner M, Leonard J, Pilarski A (2002) How industrial relations affect plant performance: the case of commercial aircraft manufacturing. Ind Labor Relat Rev 55:195–218
Kocka J (1969) Unternehmensverwaltung und Angestelltenschaft am Beispiel Siemens 1847–1914. Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart
Kocka J (1971) Family and bureaucracy in German industrial management, 1850–1914: Siemens in comparative perspective. Bus Hist Rev 45:133–156
Kocka J (1981) Capitalism and bureaucracy in German industrialization before 1914. Econ Hist Rev 34:453–468
Krueger A, Mas A (2004) Strikes, scabs, and tread separations: labor strife and the production of defective Bridgestone/Firestone tires. J Polit Econ 112(2):253–289
Lazear E (1979) Why is there mandatory retirement? J Polit Econ 87(6):1261–1284
Levinsohn J, Petrin A (2003) Estimating production functions using inputs to control for unobservables. Rev Econ Stud 70(2):317–341
Lindert P (2004) Growing public: social spending and economic growth since the eighteenth century. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Lucas R (1979) Sharing, monitoring, and incentives: marshallian misallocation reassessed. J Polit Econ 87:501–521
Marshall A (1920) Principles of economics, 8th edn. Macmillan, London
McCreary E (1968) Social welfare and business: the Krupp welfare program, 1860–1914. Bus Hist Rev 17:24–49
Mitchell B (1998) International historical statistics—Europe, 1750–1993. Stockton Press, New York
Moriguchi C (2003) Implicit contracts, the great depression, and institutional change: a comparative analysis of U.S. and Japanese employment relations, 1920–1940. J Econ Hist 63:625–665
Moses J (1982) Trade unionism in Germany from Bismarck to Hitler: 1869–1933, vol 1. George Prior Publishers, London
Newey W (1995) Convergence rates for series estimators. In: Maddala GS, Phillips PCB, Srinivasan TN (eds) Statistical methods of econometrics and quantitative economics: essays in honor of C.R. Rao. Blackwell, Cambridge
Newey W, West K (1987) A simple positive semi-definite, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix. Econometrica 55(3):703–708
Olley GS, Pakes A (1996) The dynamics of productivity in telecommunications equipment industry. Econometrica 64:1263–1297
Pakes A (1994) Dynamic structural models, problems and prospects part II: mixed continuous-discrete control problems, and market interactions. In: Sims C (ed) Advances in econometrics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Prendergast C (1993) The role of promotion in inducing specific human capital acquisition. Quart J Econ 108(2):523–534
Raff D (1988) Wage determination and the five-dollar-day at ford. J Econ Hist 48:387–399
Raff D, Summers L (1987) Did henry ford pay efficiency wages. J Labor Econ 5(4):S57–S86
Robinson P (1988) Root-N consistent semiparametric regression. Econometrica 56:931–954
Schmidt D (1993) Massenhafte Produktion? Produkte, Produktion und Beschäftigte im Stammwerk von Siemens vor 1914. Westfälisches Dampfboot, Münster
Schulz G (2000) Die Angestellten seit dem 19. Jahrhundert. Oldenbourg Verlag, München
Scott J (1958) Siemens brothers 1858–1958. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London
Shapiro C, Sitglitz J (1984) Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device. Am Econ Rev 74(3):433–444
Spencer E (1984) Management and labor in imperial Germany: ruhr industrialists as employers, 1896–1914. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick
Stiglitz JE (1976) The efficiency wage hypothesis, surplus labour, and the Distribution of Income in L.D.C.s. Oxf Econ Pap 28:185–207
von Siemens W (1966) Inventor and entrepreneur: recollections of Werner von Siemens, Second English Edition. Lund Humphries and Co and Prestel-Verlag, London and Munich
Waller E (1960) Studien zur Finanzgeschichte des Hauses Siemens, vol III. SAA 20.Ld 366
Wolak F (1994) An econometric analysis of the asymmetric information, regulator-utility interaction. Annales d’Economie et de Statistique 34:13–69