When is the optimal lending contract in microfinance state non-contingent?

European Economic Review - Tập 55 - Trang 720-731 - 2011
Doh-Shin Jeon1, Domenico Menicucci2
1Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ, IDEI), France
2Università degli Studi di Firenze, Italy

Tài liệu tham khảo

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